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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(I) 
of the Utah Code. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Did the Court abuse its discretion and incorrectly apply the law when it concluded 
that Mr. Bradford (hereafter "husband") was Mrs. Bradford's (hereafter "wife") creditor 
because wife should have reasonably believed that husband might file a divorce action and 
that he would probably claim the home and marital residence as his separate property. 
II. Did the Court abuse its discretion when it awarded the marital residence solely to 
husband because it had been inherited by him during the marriage despite finding that 
husband had deeded a joint tenancy interest in the property to wife eight (8) years prior to 
the divorce and failing to find that husband intended wife to own one-half of the marital 
residence. 
III. Did the Court abuse its discretion when it inequitably divided all of the property 
belonging to husband and wife such that husband received $186,741.00 worth of marital 
property and wife received only $6,741.00 worth of marital property. 
The grounds for seeking review of each of the above issues is that the Trial Court 
abused its discretion when it failed to make adequate findings of fact to support its 
conclusions of law and orders both with respect to the fraudulent conveyance and the 
apportionment of marital property. The Trial Court further abused its discretion and 
misapplied the law by failing to recognize the validity of the transfer of wife's joint tenancy 
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interest in the property to her son and/or by failing to award her her one-half of the marital 
residence. 
The standard of appellate review is clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion as set 
forth in Rasband v. Rasband. 751 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1988). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, ETC. 
With respect to the issue of fraudulent conveyance, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act, as set forth in Section 25-6-1 et seq., of the Utah Code Annotated is determinative. A 
copy of said Act is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case came before the Fourth District Court on a Complaint for Divorce and 
Counterclaim for fraudulent conveyance. The matter was tried to the Honorable Steven L. 
Hansen on March 4, 1998, and Findings of Fact and a Decree of Divorce were entered on 
July 14, 1998. Thereafter, defendants filed a timely Motion to Alter and Amend Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree and the Court denied said Motion September 4, 
1998. This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mr. Bradford and Mrs. Bradford were married in June of 1985 in Provo, 
Utah, and have been husband and wife since that date. (Findings of Fact No. 1, page 152, 
Record.) 
2. Both parties have been married before, making this a second marriage 
for both parties. (Findings of Fact No. 4, page 152, Record.) 
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3. No children were born of this marriage, but each had adult children from 
prior marriages. (Findings of Fact No. 5, page 151, Record.) 
4. Mr. Bradford is 63 years old and Mrs. Bradford is 65 years old. 
(Findings of Fact No. 6, page 151, Record.) 
5. At the time of the parties' marriage, Mrs. Bradford had limited assets 
other than her personal property and some property in Indianola which eventually sold for 
$5,000.00. However, Mr. Bradford gave Mrs. Bradford the funds whose returns were 
eventually used to pay off the debt on the Indianola land. Mrs. Bradford kept the returns on 
the sale of the Indianola land for herself. (Findings of Fact No. 7, page 151, Record.) 
6. Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Bradford are at a point in their life where they 
could be retained or develop new skills for purposes of substantially increasing their income. 
(Findings of Fact No. 12, page 151, Record.) 
7. Mr. and Mrs. Bradford have lived in the home in Spanish Fork, Utah, 
since the marriage. This home was paid for and given to Mr. Bradford as part of his 
inheritance before the marriage. Mr. Bradford was bom and raised in this house. This house 
has been owned by Mr. Bradford's family for many generations and has been passed down 
within the family from generation to generation. (Findings of Fact No. 13, page 151, 
Record.) 
8. The Court found that since the marriage of the parties that there have 
been improvements to the house in that the roof was repaired, a furnace was added, and the 
septic system had been repaired and the home was hooked up to city water. (Findings of 
Fact No. 14, page 150, Record.) 
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9. Although Mrs. Bradford claimed to have been an integral part of the 
improvements, the Court found that she merely made phone calls and arrangements to have 
the work completed. Any other projects, such as painting, which she did were not 
improvements but along the lines of general repair and maintenance of the home. (Findings 
of Fact No. 15, page 150, Record.) 
10. The repairs and improvements were paid for through funds which Mr. 
Bradford received from a settlement with Geneva Steel. These funds were accumulated prior 
to the marriage. (Findings of Fact No. 16, page 150, Record.) 
11. It is undisputed that the house is worth approximately $180,000.00. 
(Findings of Fact No. 17, page 150, Record.) 
12. Mr. Bradford intended to give Mrs. Bradford one-half of the marital 
residence property when he deeded her a joint tenancy interest in it and did so because he 
was happy with her, wanted to care for her, and loved her. (Record page 190, Trial transcript 
at page 56, line 11 through 13 and 25, and page 57, line 1 through 12.) 
13. Mr. Bradford deeded by way of warranty deed the property back to he 
and Mrs. Bradford as "joint tenants with full rights of survivorship and not as tenants in 
common" approximately four years after they had married. (Findings of Fact No. 18, page 
150, Record.) 
14. In 1992, Mr. Bradford filed for divorce from Mrs. Bradford. At that 
time, Mr. Bradford requested that the home and real property be awarded to him. This 
divorce action was dismissed in 1993. (Findings of Fact No. 19, page 150, Record.) 
4 
15. Since 1992, Mr. Bradford and Mrs. Bradford have had many arguments 
and Mr. Bradford has threatened to divorce Mrs. Bradford on many occasions. (Findings of 
Fact No. 20, page 150, Record.) 
16. In 1996, the parties began to jointly develop land for rezoning, division 
into lots and sale. They hired LSI, Inc., to survey the ground, prepare a subdivision plat and 
perform other pre-sales work. Mr. DeMita was to receive 25% of the profits from the sale 
for his assistance in developing the property. (Findings of Fact No. 23, page 149, Record.) 
17. In July of 1996, Mr. Bradford came home to various engineers at his 
home. Although the reasons for the ensuing argument with Mrs. Bradford are in dispute, Mr. 
Bradford was upset with the way the development was proceeding. This particular argument 
was more severe than prior arguments and divorce was discussed. (Findings of Fact No. 24, 
page 149, Record.) 
18. The parties continued to take action to develop the subject property until 
May of 1997. (Record page 190, Trial transcript at page 61, line 5 through page 73, line 25 
and page 75, line 19 through page 76, line 23.) 
19. On August 8, 1996, Mrs. Bradford by way of Quit-Claim Deed deeded 
her share of the home to her son, James DeMita. Mr. DeMite gave his mother $10.00 for the 
deed. (Findings of Fact No. 24, page 149, Record.) 
20. When Mrs. Bradford deeded her half of the property to Mr. DeMita, she 
did so because she was concerned that if she predeceased him, her children would not get 
any of her interest in the property and she was not concerned at the time about Mr. Bradford 
divorcing her. (Record page 190, Trial transcript at page 30, line 16 through 24.) 
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21. Mrs. Bradford owed nothing to Mr. Bradford and was not indebted to 
him before or after she quit claimed the subject property to her son. (Record page 190, Trial 
Transcript at page 78, lines 2 through 7.) 
22. The Court found that $ 10.00 was not equivalent value of one-half of the 
house and property. (Findings of Fact No. 26, page 149, Record.) 
23. The Court found that the transfer of the Quit-Claim Deed was made to 
an "insider" according to Utah law as Mr. DeMita is Mrs. Bradford's son. (Findings of Fact 
No. 27, page 149, Record.) 
24. Mrs. Bradford claimed that the transfer to Mr. DeMita was for estate 
planning purposes. However, she acknowledged that she only deeded the property to him 
and not her other five children, and that she did not have nor did she prepare a will at that 
time nor were instructions given regarding the disposition of the property. (Findings of Fact 
No. 28, page 149, Record.) 
25. After the transfer, Mrs. Bradford and Mr. DeMita continued to live in 
the home as they had before. (Findings of Fact No. 29, page 149, Record.) 
26. Neither Mrs. Bradford nor Mr. DeMita told Mr. Bradford of the Quit-
Claim Deed. Mr. Bradford subsequently discovered the deed when his daughter went to the 
County Recorder's Office. Mr. Bradford's daughter went to the recorder's office to verify 
that the home and property had been rezoned for development a Mr. DeMita had indicated 
to them. The daughter then discovered the Quit-Claim Deed and that in actuality the 
property had not been rezoned. (Findings of Fact No. 30, page 149, Record.) 
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27. Soon after the discovery of this information, Mr. Bradford filed for this 
divorce action. The time between the granting of the Quit-Claim Deed in August of 1996 
and the filing of divorce as approximately eleven months. (Findings of Fact No. 31, page 
148, Record.) 
28. The transfer of Mrs. Bradford's portion of the home to her son left her 
in possession of only her personal property, which has limited value. Thus, this transfer 
constituted a transfer of substantially all of her assets. (Findings of Fact No. 32, page 148, 
Record.) 
29. When asked on cross examination whether she could afford to pay Mr. 
Bradford one-half of the value of the property, Mrs. Bradford indicated that she did not have 
the funds and would have to look to family members to assist her if she were obligated to pay 
this. (Findings of Fact No. 33, page 148, Record.) 
30. At the time of the Quit-Claim Deed, Mrs. Bradford should have 
reasonably believed that Mr. Bradford might file a divorce action and the he would probably 
claim the home and property as his before the marriage as he had done so in the divorce 
action which he filed in 1992. (Findings of Fact No. 34, page 148, Record.) 
31. The Court found that the house and property is, in fact, not partitionable 
as it contains a residence, road and river frontage. If an interest were to be conveyed the 
house would have to be refinanced or sold. (Findings of Fact No. 35, page 148, Record.) 
32. Even though Mr. Bradford placed Mrs. Bradford's name on the new deed 
to the house, the Court found that the house and property belonged to Mr. Bradford as he 
inherited this from his father before the marriage. This is consistent with previous Utah 
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Supreme Court Decisions wherein the parties married later in life and one of the parties had 
brought into the marriage a significant asset which they later deeded to the other spouse and 
subsequently were divorced. (See Georgedes v. Georgedes. 627 P.2d 44 [Utah 1981]; 
Jesperson v. Jesperson. 610 P.2d 326 [Utah 1980].) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. A person asserting a fraudulent conveyance must be a creditor of the 
person claimed to have fraudulently conveyed the property. The trial court failed to find that 
Mrs. Bradford was a creditor of Mr. Bradford's. The transfer of real property between 
spouses is presumed to be a gift, it is not impliedly limited to the duration of the marriage. 
There was no evidence at trial to support Mr. Bradford's transfer of the subject property to 
Mrs. Bradford in joint tenancy was anything but a gift nor any evidence to support a finding 
that Mrs. Bradford was a creditor of Mr. Bradford's. Therefore, the threshold element of 
fraudulent conveyance fails. 
2. Generally, pre-marital property acquired by one spouse through 
inheritance or gift is considered separate property and awarded to that spouse upon divorce 
unless one of the exceptions to the rule is met. One of the exceptions occurs when the 
acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest in the subject property to the other spouse, 
in which case the property is then marital property. Mr. Bradford's quit claiming a joint 
tenancy interest to Mrs. Bradford in the subject property is presumed to be a gift and thereby 
marital property. The trial court's finding that the subject property was Mr. Bradford's 
separate property is neither supported by fact or law and should be reversed. 
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3. The trial court's decision of the real and personal property owned by the 
parties during their marriage was not equitable and there were no findings of fact to support 
the Court's inequitable division of said property. This Court has held that the overriding 
consideration in dividing property between parties to a divorce is that the ultimate division 
be equitable, and further, that marital property encompasses all of the assets of every nature 
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source derived. Equity 
requires that an unemployed 65 year old woman of a 12 year marriage be awarded more than 
$3,500.00 of a $187,000.00 marital estate. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court declared that wife's quit claiming of her one-half joint tenancy interest 
in the marital residence to her son was a fraudulent conveyance and reverted appellant, 
James DeMita's property right in said property to husband. Appellants assert that the trial 
court was mistaken in declaring that a fraudulent conveyance had taken place because the 
trial court failed to make necessary findings to support that conclusion and further that the 
court misapplied the facts to the law. 
Although the trial court made findings that the quit claim deed transfer was to an 
insider and that the transfer left wife insolvent, it failed to make a finding that husband was 
a creditor of wife's or that wife was indebted to husband. The Utah Supreme Court has 
repeatedly held that the threshold question to be answered in a fraudulent conveyance case 
is whether a party claiming a fraudulent conveyance is a creditor of the party who has 
allegedly fraudulently transferred property. It has stated that a creditor must prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that claimant is a creditor. Territorial Savings & Loan v. Baird. 781 
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P.2d 452, 458 (Utah 1989), Furniture v. Deamer. 680 P.2d 398, 399 (Utah 1984), and Meyer 
v. General Amer. Coip.. 569 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Utah 1977). Moreover, the Arizona Supreme 
Court in Clark v. Rossow. 657 P.2d 903, 904 (Az. 1982) stated that the Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act does not itself create a new claim. If a claim does not exist outside of the 
Act there is no remedy. Utahfs Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act only refers to debtors and 
creditors and specifically states at Section 25-6-5, U.C.A. under the caption "Fraudulent 
Transfer" "(1) a transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a 
creditor,..." A non-creditor of a person transferring property cannot assert a claim under 
the Fraudulent Transfer Act to set aside the conveyance of property by a party who is not his 
debtor. 
In the present case, husband deeded property that was the marital residence and that 
husband owned separately prior to the marriage to himself and wife in joint tenancy 
approximately eight years prior to commencement of the divorce proceedings. Husband's 
testimony at trial admits that wife owed him nothing and that she was not indebted to him 
before or after she gave her son the Quit Claim Deed to one-half of the marital residence. 
If the Fraudulent Conveyance Act by itself does not make husband the creditor of wife 
and if husband admits that wife never owed him any money, then husband's only basis for 
being a creditor under the Fraudulent Transfer Act is that he wants the one-half of the 
property that he deeded to his wife back. "The transfer of once separate property into joint 
names of both spouses is deemed a gift." (41 C.J.S. Section 103). "An interspousal gift 
operates as a transfer to the donee spouse of a separate property interest." (41 C.J.S. Section 
102). "A gift from a husband to his wife confers on the wife good title . . ., and is not 
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impliably limited to the duration of the marriage." (41 C J.S. Section 102). "A gift from a 
wife to her husband is binding as a transaction between other persons . . . . The husband 
cannot be compelled to return the money or property given nor can the wife reclaim or 
recover it." (41 C.J.S. Section 102). "A husband, in conveying property to his wife, is 
presumed to intend that his act will have the affect that it purports to have on its face, and 
that he parts with all his interest in the property conveyed. Placing the separate property of 
one spouse into the joint names of both spouses creates the presumption that the property 
was transferred as a gift, which presumption is rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence 
to the contrary." (41 Am. Jur.2d Section 105). See also Kerley v. Kerley. 910 P.2d 279 
(Nev. 1996). 
There was no evidence or testimony offered at trial to establish that the marital 
residence deeded by warranty deed from husband to husband and wife in joint tenancy was 
other than a gift to wife and was intended to transfer a legal, non-revocable interest in it to 
her. Certainly husband put on no evidence that meets the clear and convincing standard 
required to overcome the presumption that the transfer was a gift as stated above. 
If there is no clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that husband 
gifted a one-half interest in the marital property to his wife, and there is no evidence to 
establish that this gift was for only the term of the marriage and was to be returned upon 
divorce, then there is no basis for the trial court to find that a fraudulent conveyance had 
occurred. Wife owned a one-half interest in joint tenancy in the marital residence and had 
a right to use it as she desired. Deeding it to her son for estate planning purposes was valid. 
Nothing placed into evidence by husband created a basis for a claim against wife to meet the 
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threshold requirements of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. Therefore, the court's 
determination that conveyance of this property to her son was fraudulent should be reversed 
and the court should declare that husband and appellant, Mr. DeMita, each own a one-half 
interest in said property in common. 
If the Court determines that the trial court correctly concluded that wife had 
fraudulently transferred the marital residence to her son and properly set aside that 
conveyance, appellant wife argues that the trial court made incorrect, inadequate findings of 
fact to support its conclusion that the marital residence was husband's separate pre-marital 
property and abused its discretion when it awarded all of that property to him without offset. 
The only finding of fact made by the trial court to support its conclusion that the 
marital residence was husband's separate property is set forth in Finding of Fact No. 36. 
That finding is conclusary in nature and provides no supporting facts that the residence is 
husband's separate property other than that husband inherited said property from his parents. 
There are citations to the cases of Georgedes v. Georgedes. 627 P.2d 44 (Utah 1981), and 
Jesperson v. Jesperson. 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980), but no reference is made in the finding 
of fact as to how these cases apply to support the trial court's finding. Moreover, these cases 
that were cited were found to be part of the confusing and conflicting cases concerning 
award of pre-marital, inherited or gifted property by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of 
Mortenson v. Mortenson. 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988), and should not have been applied in 
this case. 
Mortenson. id., states that the general law with respect to the division of property 
acquired by one spouse by inheritance or gift as well as the exceptions to this rule. The 
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general rule is that property acquired by one spouse by gift or inheritance is awarded wholly 
to that spouse upon divorce. The exceptions to the rule are, (a) when the other spouse has 
contributed to the augmentation, improvement, or operation of the property or has 
significantly cared for, protected, or preserved it, thereby acquiring an equitable interest in 
the property; (b) the property has been consumed or its identity lost through commingling 
or exchanges; (c) or where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest in the property 
therein to the other spouse. 
In the present case, the subject real property was obtained by the husband as a gift or 
inheritance from his parents. At the time it was acquired husband owned the property as 
separate property. Four years into the marriage, the husband gave wife a joint tenancy 
interest in said property by titling it in both of their names. As set forth in the prior argument 
concerning fraudulent conveyance, the titling of separate property by one spouse in joint 
tenancy to both of them is presumed to be a gift to that spouse. (41 C.J.S. Section 103). 
Thus husband's deeding and recording said deed over to himself and wife changed the nature 
of the property from separate to marital per exception no. 3 of Mortenson. After this 
conveyance it became husband's obligation to put on evidence that the conveyance was not 
a gift or that another bases existed to ignore the presumption that wife held legal title to a 
one-half interest in the property. 
The testimony given at trial concerning the joint tenancy transfer of the marital 
residence supports wife's contention that it was intended as a gift to her by her husband. 
Husband's testimony was that it was his intention that wife get one-half of the property when 
he signed the joint tenancy deed. Wife testified that husband told her that the reason for 
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deeding the property to her was because he wanted her to have half of the marital residence. 
There is no testimony in the record refuting the statements that husband wanted wife to have 
one-half of the property nor refuting his intention to give it to his wife because he loved her, 
was happy with her and wanted to care for her. There is no evidence or testimony that even 
remotely suggests that the subject conveyance was for a purpose other than a gift or that the 
subject conveyance was intended to create anything but a one-half property interest for wife. 
Additionally, the evidence establishes that husband and wife made joint efforts to 
develop the property into sellable lots and entered into contracts regarding this joint venture. 
Finally, wife acted toward the property as owning a separate one-half interest when she 
conveyed her one-half interest to her son. 
The trial court abused its discretion by concluding that the marital residence was 
husband's separate property when it failed to find facts to support this conclusion and when 
the testimony and evidence supports the opposite conclusion that husband gifted a one-half 
interest in said property to his wife and, therefore, made the property marital property per 
the exceptions set forth in Mortenson. 
Even if this Court determines that the trial court was correct in finding that the marital 
residence was husband's separate property, the trial court still abused its discretion in not 
awarding half of said property to wife. In the case of Watson v. Watson. 837 P.2d 1 (Utah 
App. 1992) the Court reminded us that the rule awarding property, gifts and inheritances as 
separate property to the party who brought said property into the marriage is not invariable. 
The Watson Court further stated "[I]n appropriate circumstances, one spouse may be 
awarded property which the other spouse brought into the marriage. The rationale behind 
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this exception to the general rule is that marital property encompasses all of the assets of 
every nature possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source derived, 
and that the trial court may, in the exercise of its broad discretion, divide the property 
equitably regardless of its source or time of acquisition. Additionally, we have held that in 
dividing property between parties in a divorce action, the overriding consideration is that the 
ultimate division be equitable." (Citations omitted). 
The Bradfords had little other property to divide other than the marital residence. 
Their marriage had been of 12 years duration (hardly short by today's standard), and they 
were both nearing retirement age at the time of the divorce. It is not equitable to remove an 
unemployed 65 year old woman from her home of 12 years with only a small sum for 
alimony and $3,500.00 and leave husband with a home worth $180,000.00 plus an equal sum 
of $3,500.00. The Court made no finding to support this inequitable division and the facts 
that exist support wife's assertion that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award 
her an equitable one-half interest in the marital residence. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear from a review of the Trial Court's findings of fact that the conclusion to 
award husband the entire marital residence as his separate property is an error. Both the 
facts and the law cited support a finding that Mr. Bradford giving Mrs. Bradford a joint 
tenancy interest in the real property was a gift to her transferring an ownership interest in 
said property. There was no evidence to support any other intention by Mr. Bradford than 
that he intended for Mrs. Bradford to own one-half of said property. There was no evidence 
to support a finding that Mrs. Bradford was Mr. Bradford's creditor and, therefore, a 
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fraudulent conveyance fails. In the alternative, the gifting of the subject property by Mr. 
Bradford to his spouse ended the property's status as separate property and caused it to 
become marital property. The Court has failed to make adequate findings of fact and has 
incorrectly concluded as a matter of law that Mrs. Bradford should receive anything but one-
half of the value of the total marital estate. Appellants pray that this Court reverse the trial 
court's Order with respect to the marital residence and either award one-half of said real 
property to Mr. DeMita or to Mrs. Bradford. 
DATED March 12, 1999. 
Howard Chuntz 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, 
postage prepaid, this J (g day of March, 1999, to the following: 
Thomas R. Patton 
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, UT 84603-0200 
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The above entitled matter came before the Court for trial on March 4, 1998. The Plaintiff was 
present and represented by counsel, Thomas R. Patton. Defendants were also present and represented 
by counsel, Howard Chuntz. The Court having heard testimony and evidence and being sufficiently 
advised in the premises now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Mr. Bradford and Mrs. Bradford were married in June of 1985 in Provo, Utah and have been 
husband and wife since that date. 
2. Mr. Bradford and Mrs. Bradford are and have been residents of Utah County, Utah for at least 
three months prior to the commencement of this action. 
3. There have arisen irreconcilable differences between Mr. Bradford and Mrs. Bradford that 
make the continuation of this marriage no longer viable. 
4. Both parties have been married before, making this a second marriage for both parties. 
1 5. No children were born of this marriage, but each had adult children from prior marriages. 
2 11 6. Mr. Bradford is 63 years old and Mrs. Bradford is 65 years old. 
3 7. At the time of the parties' marriage, Mrs. Bradford had limited assets other than her personal 
4 property and some property in Indianola which eventually sold for $5000.00. However, Mr. Bradford 
5 gave Mrs. Bradford the funds whose returns were eventually used to pay off the debt on the Indianola 
6 land. Mrs. Bradford kept the returns on the sale of the Indianola land for herself. 
7 8. Mr. Bradford worked at Geneva Steel before the parties married and subsequently obtained 
8 other training and is now a janitor with Nebo School District. 
9 9. Mr. Bradford receives $410.00 from his current employment at Nebo School District, $769.00 
10 from Social Security, and $324.00 from his pension and $50.00 rent from the property for a total of 
11 $1553.00 net per month. The Court notes that Mr. Bradford pays approximately $105.00 per month into 
12 a retirement account at the school district. Since that payment is discretionary, the Court will add this 
13 to his net income for a total of $1658.00. 
14 10. Mrs. Bradford has worked at temporary jobs, but has not worked for many years as she 
15 claims that she has carpal tunnel syndrome and has difficulty focusing on her task. 
16 11. Mrs. Bradford receives approximately $150.00 for child care of her grandchild, and $381.00 
17 in Social Security for a total of $531.00 per month. 
18 12. The Court finds that neither Mr. nor Mrs. Bradford are in a point in their life where they 
19 could be retained or develop new skills for purposes of substantially increasing their income. 
20 13. Mr. Bradford and Mrs. Bradford have lived in the home in Spanish Fork, Utah since the 
21 marriage. This home was paid for and given to Mr. Bradford as part of his inheritance before the 
22 marriage. Mr. Bradford was born and raised in this house. This house has been owned by Mr. 
23 Bradford's family for many generations and has been passed down within the family from generation to 
24 
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1 generation. 
2 14. The Court finds that since the marriage of the parties that there have been improvements to 
3 the house in that the roof was repaired, a furnace was added, and the septic system had been repaired and 
4 the home was hooked up to city water. 
5 15. Although Mrs. Bradford claims to have been an integral part of the improvements, the Court 
6 finds that she merely made phone calls and arrangements to have the work completed. Any other 
7 projects, such as painting, which she did were not improvements but along the lines of general repair and 
8 maintenance of the home. 
9 16. The repairs and improvements were paid for through funds which Mr. Bradford received 
10 from a settlement with Geneva Steel. These funds were accumulated prior to the marriage. 
11 17. It is undisputed that the house is worth approximately $180,000.00. 
12 18. Mr. Bradford deeded by way of warranty deed the property back to he and Mrs. Bradford 
13 as "joint tenants with fiill rights of survivorship and not as tenants in common" approximately four years 
14 after they had married. 
15 19. In 1992, Mr. Bradford filed for divorce form Mrs. Bradford. At that time, Mr. Bradford 
16 requested that the home and real property be awarded to him This divorce action was dismissed in 1993. 
17 20. Since 1992, Mr. Bradford and Mrs. Bradford have had many arguments and Mr. Bradford 
18 has threatened to divorce Mrs. Bradford on many occasions. 
19 21. James Demita, Mrs. Bradford's adult son, has been living with Mr. Bradford and Mrs. 
20 Bradford since 1995. Mr. Demita's minor son also stays at the home from time to time. Mr. Demita 
21 stays rent free, although he is supposed to be pay the utilities. 
22 22. Mr. Demita went to one year of law school and has since worked odd jobs. At the time of 
23 the trial, Mr. Demita was working part-time at a computer store. IBs 1996 gross income was only 
24 
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1 || approximately $3500.00. 
2 || 23. In 1996, the parties began to jointly develop land for rezoning, division into lots and sale. 
3 II They hired LSI Inc. to survey the ground, prepare a subdivision plat and perform other pre-sales work. 
4 Mr. Demita was to receive 25% of the profits form the sale for his assistance in developing the property. 
5 a 24. In July of 1996, Mr. Bradford came home to various engineers at his home. Although the 
6 reasons for the ensuing argument with Mrs. Bradford are in dispute, Mr. Bradford was upset with the 
7 way the development was proceedings. This particular argument was more sever than prior arguments 
8 and divorce was discussed. 
9 I 25. On August 8,1996, Mrs. Bradford by way of Quit-claim Deed deeded her share of the home 
10 to her son James Demita. Mr. Demita gave his mother $10.00 for the deed. 
11 26. The Court finds that $10.00 was not equivalent value of one-half of the house and property. 
12 27. The Court finds that the transfer of the Quit-claim Deed was made to an "insider" according 
13 to Utah law as Mr. Demita is Mrs. Bradford's son. 
14 28. Mrs. Bradford claimed that the transfer to Mr. Demita was for estate planning purposes. 
15 However, she acknowledged that she only deeded the property to him and not her other five children, 
16 and that she did not have nor did she prepare a will at that time nor were instructions given regarding the 
17 disposition of the property. 
18 29. After the transfer, Mrs. Bradford and Mr. Demita continued to live in the home as they had 
19 before. 
20 30. Neither Mrs. Bradford nor Mr. Demita told Mr. Bradford of the Quit-claim Deed. Mr. 
21 Bradford subsequently discovered the deed when his daughter went to the County Recorder's Office. 
22 Mr. Bradford's daughter went to the recorder's office to verify that the home and property had been 
23 rezoned for development as Mr. Demita had indicated to them. The daughter then discovered the Quit-
24 
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1 claim Deed and that in actuality the property had not been rezoned. 
2 31. Soon after the discovery of this information, Mr. Bradford filed for this divorce action. The 
3 time between the granting of the Quit-claim Deed in August of 1996 and the filing of divorce was 
4 approximately eleven months. 
5 32. The transfer of Mrs. Bradford's portion of the home to her son left her in possession of only 
6 her personal property, which has limited value. Thus, this transfer constituted a transfer of substantially 
7 all of her assets. 
8 II 33. When asked on cross examination whether she could afford to pay Mr. Bradford one-half 
9 of the value of the property, Mrs. Bradford indicated that she did not have the funds and would have to 
10 look to family members to assist her if she were obligated to pay this. 
11 34. At the time of the transfer of the Quit-claim Deed, Mrs. Bradford should have reasonably 
12 believed that Mr. Bradford might file a divorce action and that he would probably claim the home and 
13 property as his before the marriage as he had done so in the divorce action which he filed in 1992. 
14 35. The Court finds that the house and property is in fact not partitionable as it contains a 
15 residence, road and river frontage. If an interest were to be conveyed the house would have to be 
16 refinanced or sold. 
17 36. Even though Mr. Bradford placed Mrs. Bradford's name on the new deed to the house, the 
18 Court finds that the house and property belong to Mr. Bradford as he inherited this from his father before 
19 the marriage. This is consistent with previous Utah Supreme Court Decisions wherein the parties married 
20 later in life and one of the parties had brought into the marriage a significant asset which they later deeded 
21 to the other spouse and subsequently were divorced. See Georgedes vs. Georgedes, 627 P.2d 44 (Utah 
22 1981); Jesperson vs. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980). 
23 37. Mr. Bradford earns $1926.00 per month. He nets approximately $1658. His financial 
24 
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1 declaration indicates that his monthly expenses are $1000.00 per month without rent or a mortgage 
2 payment. The Court finds that these expenses are reasonable and necessary. 
3 | 38. Mr. Bradford has approximately $600.00 per month after necessary expenses. Mr. Bradford 
4 would also have at his disposal the house and property which do not currently have a mortgage and are 
5 worth approximately $180,000.00. 
6 | 39. Mrs. Bradford nets $531.00, per month. She listed her expenses at $1750 which includes 
7 $600.00 for rent (which she is currently not paying). This leaves Mrs. Bradford with a shortfall of 
8 approximately $1200.00 per month. Mrs. Bradford is 65 years old, not trained in an employable skill, and 
9 has health concerns. She gives part-time child care to her grandson for which she is paid $150.00 per 
10 month. Although she may be able to earn more from child care, there was insufficient evidence that she 
11 would be able to find such a position or that even if she were to increase her child care hours that it 
12 would meet her shortfall. Thus, the Court finds that Mrs. Bradford has a need for alimony. 
13 40. Mrs. Bradford has expenses which exceed her income and cannot make up the shortfall. Mr. 
14 Bradford has approximately $600.00 per month in income which exceeds his expenses. Therefore, Mr. 
15 Bradford shall pay Mrs. Bradford $600.00 per month in alimony for a term not exceeding the length of 
16 the marriage. This would give $1131.00 to Mrs. Bradford to meet her expenses and leave $1058.00 for 
17 Mr. Bradford's expenses. 
18 41. Mr. and Mrs. Bradford have acquired the following personal property during the marriage 
19 which property had value at the time of the trial as follows: 
20 First Security Bank Accounts: $6492.00 
21 ValicIRA $2418.00 
22 Utah Retirement $1583.00 
23 Insurance Policy Cash Value $3990.00 
24 
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11 42. The Court finds that each party should be awarded one-half of the total sum of the above 
2 personal property. The remainder of the personal property has been divided between the parties and the 
3 same should be awarded as divided. 
4 Having entered its Findings of Fact, the Court now enters it: 
5 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
6 1. This Court has jurisdiction over the matter in accordance with the provisions of Utah Code 
7 Ann. § 78-3-4(1). 
8 2. The parties are entitled to a Decree of Divorce on the basis of irreconcilable differences. 
9 3. The Court concludes pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-2(4) and § 25-6-5 that Mr. Bradford 
10 is a creditor of Mrs. Bradford in that he has a claim to the real property which Mrs. Bradford deeded to 
11 her son, Mr. Demita. 
12 4. The Court concludes that this transfer between Mr. Bradford and Mr. Demita was made to 
13 an insider pursuant to § 25-6-2(7) of the Utah Code. 
14 5. The Court concludes that this transfer made Mrs. Bradford insolvent, according to § 25-6-3 
15 of the Utah Code, as her debts exceeded her income after the transfer was made. 
16 6. According to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5, the Court concludes that the transfer 
17 by Mrs. Bradford to her son Mr. Demita was a fraudulent transfer. The Court looks to the fact that Mrs. 
18 Bradford only received $10.00 for the Quit-claim Deed, not an equivalent value, and that she believed 
19 or reasonably should have believed that she would incur debts beyond her ability to pay if she were 
20 divorced from Mr. Bradford. The Court also looks to the evidence and applies it to the factors listed in 
21 § 25-5-6(2) and notes that the transfer was concealed from Mr. Bradford, Mrs. Bradford continued to 
22 live in the house as before, Mr. Bradford had threatened Mrs. Bradford with divorce a matter of weeks 
23 before the transfer, and the transfer was substantially all of the assets that Mrs. Bradford believed that 
24 
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she had. 
7. The Court accordingly sets aside the transfer that Mrs. Bradford made to Mr. Demita as the 
transfer was a fraudulent conveyance. 
8. The Court concludes that the property and the house are Mr. Bradford's as he inherited them 
before the marriage, the parties married later in life for twelve years with no children of issue of the 
marriage and that Mrs. Bradford brought minimal assets into the marriage and contributed little financially 
to the improvements on the house. 
9. Since Mrs. Bradford has a need for alimony in the amount of nearly $1200.00 which she 
cannot substantially reduce, and since Mr. Bradford has approximately $600.00 per month at his disposal 
after expenses, the Court concludes that Mr. Bradford pay $600 per month alimony to Mrs. Bradford 
which payment shall not exceed the length of the marriage. 
10. The Court concludes that the parties shall divide equally the accounts listed in Finding 
number 41. 
11. Each party has requested attorneys' fees; however, neither party has submitted testimony 
regarding that issue. Therefore, each party shall pay their own costs and attorney's fees. 
DATED this /'/ day of Mie/1998 
BY THE COURT 
Approved as to F' c *>•; v * '}'•-
- ~"?3/fi* 
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The above entitled matter came before the Court for trial on March 4,1998. The Plaintiff was 
present and represented by counsel, Thomas R Patton. Defendants were also present and represented 
by counsel, Howard Chuntz. The Court having heard testimony and evidence and being sufficiently 
advised in the premises and having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now 
enters the following: 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the matter in accordance with the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-3-4(1). 
2. The parties are granted a Decree of Divorce on the basis of irreconcilable differences. 
3. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-2(4) and § 25-6-5 Mr. Bradford is a creditor of Mrs. 
Bradford in that he has a claim to the real property which Mrs. Bradford deeded to her son, Mr. Demita. 
4. This transfer between Mr. Bradford and Mr. Demita was made to an insider pursuant to § 25-
1 6-2(7) of the Utah Code. 
2 5. This transfer made Mrs. Bradford insolvent, according to § 25-6-3 of the Utah Code, as her 
3 debts exceeded her income after the transfer was made. 
4 6. According to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5, the transfer by Mrs. Bradford to her 
5 son Mr. Demita was a fraudulent transfer. The Court looks to the fact that Mrs. Bradford only received 
6 $10.00 for the Quit-claim Deed, not an equivalent value, and that she believed or reasonably should have 
7 believed that she would incur debts beyond her ability to pay if she were divorced from Mr. Bradford. 
8 The Court also looks to the evidence and applies it to the factors listed in § 25-5-6(2) and notes that the 
9 transfer was concealed from Mr. Bradford, Mrs. Bradford continued to live in the house as before, Mr. 
10 Bradford had threatened Mrs. Bradford with divorce a matter of weeks before the transfer, and the 
11 transfer was substantially all of the assets that Mrs. Bradford believed that she had. 
12 7. The Court accordingly sets aside the transfer that Mrs. Bradford made to Mr. Demita as the 
13 transfer was a fraudulent conveyance. Therefore, Mr. Bradford is awarded all right title and interest in 
14 the property located at 1100 South Main, Spanish Fork, Utah. The property is more particularly 
15 described as: 
16 I Parcel No. 2: Beginning at a point which is West 322.35 feet and North 1288.95 feet 
from the East quarter corner of Section 25, Township 8 South, Range 2 East, of the Salt 
17 || Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 89© 53' 7" West 259.68 feet; thence South 1© 42' 
11" West 71.44 feet; thence South 59o 44'38" West 313.10 feet; thence North 66o 59' 
18 || 34" West along the North bank of the Spanish Fork River 668.40 feet; thence along said 
river bank South 87o 48' 04" West 592.12 feet; thence North 47o 54' 45" West 140.69 
19 || feet; thence North 65© 44' 29" East 1150.07 feet; thence South 52o 37 40" East 509.07 
feet; thence South 58© 16'44" East 122.86 feet; thence North 38o 08* 23" East 7.40 feet; 
20 || thence South 68o 07 31" East 188.79 feet; thence South 88o 17 42" East 110.24 feet; 
thence South 1° 41' 54" West 134.30 feet to the point of beginning. 
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Together with 13 shares in the Spanish Fork Southeast Irrigation Company. 
8. Since Mrs. Bradford has a need for alimony in the amount of nearly $1200.00 which she 
cannot substantially reduce, and since Mr. Bradford has approximately $600.00 per month at his disposal 
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after expenses, the Court orders that Mr. Bradford pay $600 per month alimony to Mrs. Bradford which 
payment shall not exceed the length of the marriage. 
19. The Court orders that the parties shall divide equally the accounts listed below: 
First Security Bank Accounts: $6492.00 
ValicIRA $2418.00 
Utah Retirement $ 15 83.00 
Insurance Policy Cash Value $3990.00 
11. The Court orders thatjeach oarty shall pay their own costs and attorney's fees. 
DATED this /tf day office,/I998. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to Form: 
IOWARD C H U N T Z - ^ ' 
STEVEN TT riAiNiciN KI C - ^ - ' ^ y i •':"-* >C 
DistrictCourt Judge ^ . {&&%**£*&$. ? M 
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4 foregoing Order to the Honorable Steven L. Hansen for his signature upon the expiration of five (5) days 
5 from the date of this notice, plus three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that 
6 time pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. 
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11 I Attorney for Plaintiff 
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ADDENDUM "C 
Howard Chuntz, No. 4208 
Attorney for Defendant 
1149 West Center Street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Telephone: (801) 222-9700 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE R. BRADFORD, 
MOTION TO ALTER AND 
Plaintiff, AMEND FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
v. DECREE 
ANDREA O. BRADFORD and JAMES A. 
DEMITA, 
Civil No. 974401237CS 
Defendants. Judge Steven L. Hansen 
/ 
COME NOW defendants in the above captioned matter, by and through their attorney, 
Howard Chuntz, and move the Court to alter and amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and the Decree of Divorce entered in this matter pursuant to Rules 52(b) and 59(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Findings of Fact at paragraph 18 reflect that Mr. Bradford deeded the property to 
he and Mrs. Bradford in joint tenancy, but do not reflect any statement concerning Mr. 
Bradford's intent or the reason for doing so. The Findings of Fact should be amended to include 
two additional findings as follows: 
a. When Mr. Bradford deeded the property to Mrs. Bradford in joint tenancy, it 
was his intent to give her half the property. (See video tape at 2:35:30-48 and 3:09:45-3:10:05). 
b. Mr. Bradford gave half of the property to Mrs. Bradford because he wanted 
her to have half, because he wanted to take care of her and because he loved her. (See video 
tape at 2:36:27-51 and 3:44:20-50). 
The Court's Findings of Fact reflect at paragraph 19 that at the time of the 1992 divorce 
proceedings, Mr. Bradford requested that the home and real property be awarded to him and that 
that action was dismissed in 1993. There should be additional findings of fact to reflect that Mr. 
Bradford took no action nor made any demand of Mrs. Bradford for a reconveyance of the 
subject property subsequent to the 1992 divorce until filing again in 1997. 
The Court should find that at the time Mrs. Bradford quit claimed her interest in the 
property to Mr. DeMita, she was not indebted to Mr. Bradford. (See video tape at 3:07:20-30). 
There is no evidence to support finding no. 34 that Mrs. Bradford should have reasonably 
believed that Mr. Bradford might file a divorce action and that he would probably claim the 
home and property as he had done so in the divorce action in 1992. From the facts and 
circumstances adduced at trial and under which the parties lived, Mrs. Bradford could just have 
reasonably believed that Mr. Bradford had given up any demand for a return of half of the 
property that he gave to her. This belief could be reasonably founded on the basis that there had 
been no further demand to deliver the property to him during the intervening four to five years, 
despite the numerous threats of divorce, and in addition, because the parties continued to deal 
with the property as joint owners, particularly with respect to their efforts to develop and sell 
lots in the property. In fact, it seems more reasonable that Mrs. Bradford should have expected 
that any issue concerning demand for return of the property was long in the past and that she and 
Mr. Bradford, in fact, each owned one-half because the parties continued to work together to 
develop and sell the property after the "severe argument and discussion of divorce in July of 
1996 and the fact that no divorce action took place for a year after that time. 
The Court's finding in paragraph 36 that ". . .the house and property belonged to Mr. 
Bradford . . . " is not consistent with the evidence nor case law. Although Mr. Bradford owned 
the property prior to the parties' marriage, he chose to give half of it to Mrs. Bradford after they 
had been married several years because he cared for her, wanted to take care of her and because 
he loved her. He intended to give her the property and it was his intent that she own one-half 
of it. This gifting of one-half of the property changed the nature of the property from solely 
owned pre-marital property to jointly held marital property as set forth in Mortensen v. 
Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988). In that case, the Court ruled that property acquired by 
gift or inheritance by one spouse should be awarded to that spouse on divorce unless the 
2 
acquiring spouse places title in their joint names in such a manner as to evidence and intent to 
make it marital property, (id) That is the very situation in the present case. Mr. Bradford 
obtained the property as a gift from his parents, but deeded it in joint tenancy to Mrs. Bradford 
with the intent to give her half because he cared for her, loved her, wanted to take care of her 
and wanted her to have one-half of the property. The case of Jesperson v. Jesperson cited in 
paragraph 36 of the Court's Findings should be distinguished as not applicable to the present case 
because in that case the Court found " . . . there was no intention by plaintiff to create a one-half 
property interest in defendant, nor any expectation by defendant that he had received a one-half 
property interest." (Jesperson v. Jesperson. 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980). The case of 
(Georgedes) cited by the Court in paragraph 36 should also be distinguished. In that case the 
Court considered the marriage of fairly short duration whereas in this case the marriage is of 
almost thirteen years. In addition, the Court also weighed in connection with the property 
settlement the fact that the party receiving the property was also being burdened with all of the 
outstanding debts and that any increase in the value of the property was offset by the marital debt 
that was being taken on. Finally, Georgedes was decided several years prior to Mortensen v. 
Mortensen and makes no mention of the Court's rule in Mortensen regarding the gifted property. 
The Court should amend paragraph 3 of the Conclusions of Law to reflect that Mr. 
Bradford was not a creditor of Mrs. Bradford's because Mr. Bradford's claim to the real property 
is not based on any legal right and Mrs. Bradford's knowledge of any such claim at the time of 
her conveyance to her son would have been purely speculative. 
The Court should amend paragraph 6 of its Conclusions of Law to reflect that the 
conveyance from Mrs. Bradford to Mr. DeMita was not a fraudulent transfer. 
The Court should amend paragraph 7 of the Conclusions of Law so as to remove the same 
and not set aside the transfer from Mrs. Bradford to Mr. DeMita as no fraudulent conveyance 
occurred. 
The Court should amend paragraph 8 of the Conclusions of Law to be reflective of the 
amended Findings of Fact set forth above by defendants. 
3 
In the alternative, if the Court continues to conclude that there was a fraudulent 
conveyance, it should conclude that the parties own the real property jointly, that the property 
should be sold and the equity divided equally between them as each of them needs the funds 
therefrom to maintain a place of abode and that the property cannot be equitably divided without 
sale. 
Defendant, Andrea Bradford, should be restored to her former name of Andrea DeMita. 
Finally, the Court should amend and alter paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Decree of 
Divorce to be consistent with the amendments and alterations to the foregoing Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and to reflect that either Mr. Bradford owns a one-half interest in the 
subject real property or that Mrs. Bradford owns a one-half interest in the subject property and 
to require the property to be sold and the proceeds divided between Mr. Bradford and whichever 
of the defendants the Court deems to own the other half. 
The Court has broad discretion in dividing the parties' property at the time of a divorce 
regardless of its source or time of acquisition. In the exercise of discretion, trial courts need to 
be guided by the general purpose to be achieved by a property division, which is to allocate the 
property in a manner which best serves the needs of the parties and best permits them to pursue 
their separate lives. Read v. Read. 594 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979). The Court's present Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree work an entirely and equitable outcome. The parties 
were married more than twelve years and are now into or close to their retirement from gainful 
employment. It is inequitable and does not serve the best interest of the parties to go forward 
in their lives to deprive Mrs. Bradford of any and all value in the real property that she was 
given by Mr. Bradford and which she believes she owned for more than seven years. The facts 
of the case, the law applicable to this case, and equity all require that the Court amend and alter 
its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and the Decree as set forth herein and defendants' 
4 
respectfully pray that the same be done. 
DATED thisSnchday of July, 1998. 
Howard Chuntz 
Attorney for Defendants 
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/ 
The Court having reviewed defendants' Motion to Alter and Amend Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce and finding that the Court's original Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law issued by Judge Hansen are appropriate, therefore, denies defendants' 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on March 4, 1998) 
(Direct examination of Mrs. Bradford by Mr. Patton in 
progress. Certain portions extracted) 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: Do you think that those 
things are worth more than $500 if you added them all 
together? 
A. I don't know the market value that people 
would buy -- what they would pay for it. I don't know 
how much people would pay me for those. 
repl 
now 
that 
old 
your 
Q. 
A. 
ace . 
Q. 
that 
you 
A. 
-- I 
Q. 
Would it be worth more 
It would be worth more 
it I would have to 
Can you tell the 
's worth more than 
own that is worth 
A stereo, stereo 
THE COURT: What 
than a thousand? 
to me because to 
pay more. 
Court 
$300, 
what you 
any item 
own right 
of property 
more than $3 00? 
console. 
conso! 
THE WITNESS: A stereo 
don't know how you 
THE COURT: For a 
Le? 
console. It's an 
L say it -- a console. 
L stereo? 
THE WITNESS: Console. 
BY MR. PATTON: Do you 
deposition last year? 
A. Yes. 
remember when I took 
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that 
and 
Q. You 
correct? 
A. 
Q. 
six 
A. 
Yes, 
And 
chairs 
Yes, 
indicated that you 
that's correct. 
you also owned a 
; is that right? 
that's right. 
own 
wooden 
two dressers,- is 
kitchen table 
Q. And then you also had personal pictures and 
family genealogy? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And those items--
A. And a bed. 
Q. And a bed. And that if they were all added 
together, and you had to sell them at a yard sale or 
sell them as used furniture, could you get more than a 
thousand dollars for them? 
A. Antiques, like -- I don't know. 
Q. You don't know? 
A. I don't know what people pay. 
Q. Do ycu remember signing a quit claim deed to 
Mr. Demita? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was for half of the property that 
Mr. Bradford owned prior to the marriage; is that 
correct? 
A. What I owned --my half what I owned is what 
5 
I quit claimed. 
Q. You quit claimed to Mr. Demita? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did you do that? 
A. When did I do that? 
Q. Yes. 
A. August 8th, 1996. 
Q. I'm going to show you what's been marked 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 for identification and ask 
if you recognize that document. Is that a copy of the 
quit claim you signed to Mr. Demita? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. And when you are looking at that quit claim 
deed, whose handwriting is printed in there word, 
"Andrea Bradford, Spanish Fork, James Demita," whose 
handwriting is that? 
A. That's James Demita's handwriting. I asked 
him to make up the form for me. 
Q. And then you signed the quit claim deed? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And it was notarized? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was by Lorea Galloway? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And whose office did you go to so that could 
6 
be notarized? 
A. It wasn't an office, I went to a bank. 
Q. You went to a bank and had it notarized? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Prior to signing that quit claim deed did 
you talk to my client about it? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you tell him you were going to do it? 
A. No. 
Q. After you did it did you tell him you had 
signed that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You did tell him? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did you tell him you had done it? 
A. In order to get the right date it was one of 
the only times that Phyllis Penner came into our 
kitchen --so she might remember the date -- and 
Phyllis and George were in the kitchen with me, and I 
told George and Phyllis both that they didn't need to 
worry about their concerns they had about if I died 
first that his children wouldn't get any of the 
property. So I told them that I took care of it to 
make sure, and I ensured that -- I promised you that 
you will get half of the property because I took care 
7 
of it so that it will be that way. 
MR. PATTON: May I approach the witness, 
your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. PATTON: Your Honor, we would submit 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 for identification as 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. l. 
THE COURT: Okay, you're offering it into 
evidence. Any objection? 
MR. CHUNTZ: No objection, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Number 1 will be received. 
(Exhibit No. l received into evidence) 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: When I took your deposition 
I asked you if you owed Mr. Demita any money when you 
signed that quit claim deed, and in fact you didn't 
owe him any money when you signed that, did you? 
A. No. 
Q. And when I asked you why you signed it you 
said it was simply estate planning. Is that why you 
signed that deed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you sign a will? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you go see an attorney? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Who did you go see? 
A. Howard Chuntz. 
Q. And you went to his office and met with him 
prior to signing the quit claim deed? 
A. I can't remember if it was on the telephone 
or in his office, but I remember he told me I had two 
options, that I could either -- I wasn't knowledgeable 
about how to take care of my -- what I owned in case I 
died, and so I asked him what I -- how I should ensure 
that my child will get what I have -- what I own when 
I die. He said I have two options, I could either 
quit claim it or I could put it in some kind of a 
trust -- family fund or something like that, and he 
said the second option will cost you money to do that, 
and the first -- quit claim won't cost you any money, 
and I said, "Well, I'll--" so I decided I wanted to do 
it the quit claim way. 
Q. When I took your deposition last year you 
indicated that you believed you had talked to him by 
phone; isn't that correct? 
A. Say that again. 
Q. Last year when I took your deposition you 
believed that you had talked to Mr. Chuntz by phone 
and received that advice; isn't that correct? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And you still believe you talked to him by 
phone, don't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It was Mr. Demita who actually went to his 
office and met with him; isn't that true? 
A. No, he was the one that was talking on the 
phone with me. 
Q. So it was Mr. Demita who called Mr. Chuntz? 
A. I don't know who dialed the number, but it 
was -- I needed some attorney and I didn't ever have 
an attorney in my life so I asked my son which 
attorney I could find this information from, and he 
suggested Howard Chuntz. 
Q. And when you signed the quit claim deed I 
asked you if you believed the home was worth --or the 
property was worth $190,000, and your answer was yes, 
wasn't it? 
A. Say that again. 
Q. The home and the land that you quit claim 
deeded to Mr. Demita, if it hadn't been divided I 
asked you if you believed it was worth $190,000, and 
you said yes, you believed that, didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you still believe that? 
A. That is what the county had when they sent 
10 
our tax notice. 
Q. And you received from Mr. Demita for your 
one-half interest $10; is that correct? 
A. Not correct. 
Q. Did he give you any money? 
A. He gave me labor, which would amount to more 
than enough. 
Q. So when you say you gave it to him for an 
estate plan, you're now saying it wasn't an estate 
plan, you sold him your property? 
MR. CHUNTZ: Objection, your Honor, she 
hasn't said it wasn't for estate planning. He's 
mischaracterizing the witness' statement. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: How many children do you 
have, ma'am? 
A. Five. 
Q. Are they all still alive? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are all of their names on that quit claim 
deed? 
A. No. 
Q. Just Mr. Demita's? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you did that for estate planning 
11 
purposes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did you intend -- did you intend to 
continue living in the home? When you signed the deed 
did you plan to continue living in the home? 
A. Actually I didn't have any plans. 
Q. You had no plans? 
A. No plans. 
Q. Did you continue to live in the home? 
A. I did, but--
Q. Did you believe that Mr. Demita was going to 
force you to not live in the home? Did you expect he 
was going to force you out of the home? 
A. Again, I never had any thoughts about 
anything like that. 
Q. When did you intend for him to actually own 
the half-interest in the home? Was it when you died 
or was it when you gave him the deed? 
MR. CHUNTZ: Objection, your Honor, that 
calls for a legal conclusion, the deed and delivery of 
the deed created ownership, occupancy has nothing to 
do with that. I think the questions are confusing to 
the witness. 
THE COURT: He's not asking for a legal 
conclusion, he wants to know what her intent was, 
12 
overruled. 
MR. CHUNTZ: Maybe he could rephrase it in a 
way that doesn't--
THE COURT: Go ahead and rephrase it. 
MR. PATTON: And I'll do that, your Honor. 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: I'm not trying to trick you, 
ma'am. I'm trying to figure out this: did you plan 
that he would immediately own half the home when you 
gave him the deed, or did you plan that he got it when 
you died? Do you understand the difference? 
A. Okay, say that slower. 
Q. Did you plan that he would get the home when 
you deeded it to him? In other words when you signed 
the deed that, "I'm giving you half my home now," or 
did you plan that he wouldn't actually get that until 
you died? 
MR. CHUNTZ: Your Honor, objection again. 
That goes to the question of ownership as opposed to 
the question of occupancy. I think the witness could 
be confused as to whether her leaving the home had to 
do with ownership or not. I mean these are legal 
technicalities that we understand but lay men don't 
particularly understand. 
THE COURT: Well, I think you can follow up 
with your own questions to her to help her understand. 
13 
I think Mr. Patton's question is appropriate, it only 
goes to what she-
May I approach the witness, MR. PATTON 
your Honor? 
THE COURT: 
MR. PATTON 
THE COURT: 
--her intent. 
May I approach the witness? 
Go ahead. 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: Mrs. Bradford, I'm going to 
show you some questions that I asked you last year at 
the deposition. My question was, "When did you intend 
for him to get it?" And your answer was? 
A. "The date that I signed it over to him." 
Q. And then my question was, "So you intended 
it to be his at that time?" And what was your answer? 
A. "Yes." 
Q. And then my question was, "But you continued 
to live in the home?" And what was your answer? 
A. "And why not?" 
Q. And then you said, "Why not?" And then I 
pressed you further, I asked the question again, "You 
continued to live in the home, yes or no?" And what 
was your answer? 
A. "Yes." 
Q. And you still live in the home? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. So even though you gave him the deed, you 
lived in the home? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you used it as your primary residence? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And I asked you -- may I approach the 
witness again? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: My question was, "Did you 
tell my client, Mr. Bradford, that you had signed that 
quit claim deed?" And what was your answer? 
A. "I had no reason to." 
Q. Do you remember having an argument with my 
client in July of 1996? 
A. (No response) 
Q. Do you remember some engineers coming to the 
home? 
A. Can I answer your first question? 
Q. You bet. 
A. I can remember having arguments with your 
client continuously through our marriage. 
Q. Do you remember a specific argument that 
happened in July of 1996 when there were some 
engineers in the home? Do you remember that day? 
A. Yes. 
1 Q. And did you and he have an argument? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. And was he complaining that he didn't want 
4 the home condemned? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. And he was also complaining that he didn't 
7 like Mr. Demita living there for nothing, without 
8 paying; isn't that true? 
9 A. That's what he claimed, but that wasn't 
10 true, that he was living for nothing. 
11 Q. When you signed this quit claim deed to Mr. 
12 Demita August 8th, within a month of the argument that 
13 takes place in July -- you acknowledge you had that 
14 argument, right? 
15 A. In July we had an argument. 
16 Q. You signed the quit claim in August, right? 
17 When you signed that quit claim deed to Mr. Demita, 
18 did you have any side agreements with him concerning 
19 that quit claim deed? In other words, he's going to 
2 0 give it back to you or anything like that? 
21 A. No. 
22 Q. Did you have an agreement that he would 
23 continue to allow you to live there? 
24 A. We didn't discuss anything at all. I was 
25 just doing what I wanted to do. 
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Q. So you didn't have a discussion about it? 
A. No, that I remember. 
Q. When you deeded that property away to Mr. 
Demita, the property that you kept in your possession, 
was it worth $4 0,000 or $50,000? In other words, your 
furniture, your car, everything else you owned, was it 
worth $40,000? 
A. You mean if I sold it? 
Q. Right. May I approach again, your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: I took your deposition last 
year, and my question was, "The real property that you 
deeded away, did you own any other assets that were 
worth $40,000 or $50,000?" And what was your answer? 
A. "No." 
Q. And my question was, "Did you own any other 
assets that were worth $85,000 or $90,000?" And what 
was your answer? 
A. "No." 
Q. And you don't own any property now that is 
worth $40,000 or $50,000, do you? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you remember filing an affidavit in this 
matter for an order to show cause? 
A. What do you mean? 
17 
Q. A document called an affidavit. 
A. That I signed? 
Q. Yes. Do you remember signing one? 
A. About what? 
MR. PATT0N: May I approach the witness, 
your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: Let me show you what's been 
marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2 for identification. 
It's entitled, "Affidavit of Andrea Bradford," and it 
purports to have been signed by Andrea Bradford. Do 
you recognize that document? 
A. Yes, that's -- you're right. 
Q. I want you to continue looking at that. The 
first paragraph says that you're the defendant in the 
action, that just labels who you are; is that right? 
A. Right. 
Q. And then it indicates that you received a 
one-half joint tenancy interest in 1989, that's 
paragraph 2, right? 
A. Yes. 
0. And then you state that during your 12 years 
of marriage you've helped to maintain the property, 
care for it and improve it. 
A. Yes. 
18 
Q. What improvements did you make to the 
property during the 12 years of the marriage, ma'am? 
A. When I say improve it, does that mean that I 
have to -- are you saying that it was from my own 
personal money or from our marital money that I made 
the improvements? 
Q. Ma'am, I didn't write the affidavit, I'm 
asking you what you meant. Do you know what you 
meant ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did you mean? 
THE COURT: Which paragraph are you 
referring to? 
MR. PATTON: May I approach, your Honor? I 
can give you a copy of the affidavit, if you want it. 
THE COURT: I think I have it, let's just 
make sure it's the right one. 
MR. PATTON: I'm referring to paragraph 3 of 
her affidavit. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
THE WITNESS: You want -- okay--
Q. BY MR. PATTON: Let me ask you this, did you 
build on any rooms on the home? 
A. No, but more important, I built -- I had 
installed the basic utilities that we needed that 
19 
weren't there when I moved in. 
Q. What basic utilities were those? 
A. I don't have the drain field with me here, 
but I have the others with me, the documents what I 
improved on. 
Q. And I'm just asking what improvements did 
you make? I'm not asking to see the documents, I just 
want to know what--
A. I called up -- this was one of our very 
first arguments. 
Q. Stop there. I don't want an explanation. 
A. Okay, because you said--
Q. Did you build on a room? Let me ask you 
that, did you build a room or make any additions to 
the home? 
A. Yes, I made additions to the home. 
Q. Just tell me what the exact additions --
just list what the additions were. 
A. One was a sewer so we could use the septic 
tank -- sewage system. I had to order a new drain 
field. 
Q. So you improved the septic system? 
A. No, there was no septic system there when I 
moved in. The black sludge was coming up into the 
home in the basement where I had to take a shower, and 
20 
there was no plumbing sewage place, there was nothing 
there for a sewage to go to, it was plugged with a 
piece of wood, so I had to keep unplugging the piece 
of wood to use the shower that I had to have to take a 
shower, and then plug the piece back in. 
Q. Ma'am, I know you want to tell your story, 
and your counsel can let you do that. I just asked --
let me ask you this. Was there indoor plumbing when 
you moved into the home? 
A. Not up to city code, no. 
Q. But there was indoor plumbing? 
A. Very poor. 
Q. Just yes or no. 
A. There was some plumbing, I'll say, some. 
Q. And so when you say that the addition was 
made, what you did was you improved the plumbing? 
A. Yes. And then another thing I improved, I 
improved was there was also -- I ordered a -- the 
chimney hadn't been cleaned for long years -- many 
years, so I improved to have the chimney cleaned, but 
the furnace man said to have the coal furnace cleaned 
so that --to eliminate all of the coal smoke that was 
coming throughout the house constantly, so when I had 
it cleaned the furnace man said the coal furnace was 
so defective that the tears -- I think that's the 
21 
word -- were all--
Q. Did you add a furnace, is that what--
A. So I ordered a new furnace and changed it 
from coal to gas furnace. 
Q. So you ordered a new furnace and you 
improved the septic system? 
A. And also the well, the drinking water, and 
the water I used for brushing my teeth and the shower 
was contaminated, so I had to have it tested at the --
by the State, and I have a thing here to--
Q. Did you dig a new well? 
A. No, we didn't. Our bishop asked George 
to -- more or less told George to get on the city 
water right now. 
Q. So did you get on city water? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now besides improving the septic system, 
changing the furnace and changing to city water, did 
you make any improvements to the property or any 
additions? 
A. What would entail improvements? 
Q. Well, I don't know, that's why I asked you. 
You said you made improvements and I asked you what 
they were. Now you've listed three. 
A. In the back, out in the back where the farm 
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is I did a lot of cleaning up to improve the 
sanitation and the health and life risks that were 
there. 
Q. So you also cleaned up around the home? 
A. In the home and in the back of the whole 
property. 
Q. What else did you do? 
A. I did so much I don't think I'd ever be able 
to tell you here. 
Q. Well, I'm just asking you what your 
improvements were. Are those the big items that you 
did? 
A. Those are the main ones, but there are many, 
many smaller ones that were equally as threatening to 
my health and my life. 
Q. So those were day-to-day maintenance items; 
is that right? The other items were more day-to-
day -- they weren't a big project, but you would work 
on a regular basis; is that what you're saying? 
A. Now what did you say? 
Q. You've listed the main items that you 
improved; is that correct, the ones you've listed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then you state that there were other 
things that you did, right? 
1 A. Yes, many. 
2 Q. But those were more on a day-to-day basis 
3 and not a big project like improving the sewer or 
4 changing the plumbing. We're talking day-to-day go 
5 out and haul trash away, clean things up and make it 
6 more presentable; is that right? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. And when you say that you maintained the 
9 property, that's what you're saying when you 
10 maintained it and cared for it; isn't that correct? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. You also indicate in paragraph 6, it says, 
13 "My conveyance of my interest in this subject real 
14 property did not and has not made me insolvent." 
15 Isn't that what you said? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. What did you mean? 
18 A. Well, I asked you what insolvent meant 
19 because I'm not that--
20 Q. And I'm asking you what you meant when you 
21 filed the affidavit. 
22 A. I thought it meant that I would be 
23 destitute, or something like that, I don't know, and I 
24 never lacked for anything, even with my conveyance, I 
25 know I would not lack. 
24 
Q. And the reason you didn't lack is because 
you were married to Mr. Bradford who supported you; 
isn't that true? 
A. That's kind of questionable. 
Q. Are you saying you can support yourself? 
A. I never felt that I was supported. 
Q. Are you saying you can support yourself if 
you're divorced, that you don't need money from Mr. 
Bradford? 
A. I don't know the future because I can't 
foresee what I might -- I'm 65, I don't know if I'll 
be -- my health might deteriorate or whatever, I can't 
foresee the future. 
Q. The fact of the matter is, ma'am, when you 
signed that affidavit saying that you weren't 
insolvent, you didn't know what the word "insolvent" 
meant, did you? 
A. I thought it meant being without, I think, 
without anything. 
MR. PATTON: I have no further questions of 
this witness. 
THE COURT: Let's take a five minute break. 
We'll be in recess for five minutes. 
(Short recess) 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: When I took your deposition 
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last year, I asked you this question: "Did you owe 
Mr. Demita -- when you signed this quit claim deed to 
Mr. Demita, did you owe him any money?" And what was 
your answer? 
A. "No." 
Q. And I said, "Okay, can you tell me why you 
signed the quit claim deed to Mr. Demita?" And your 
answer was, "Sure." And then I said, "Why did you 
sign it?" And what was your answer? 
A. "It was simply estate planning." 
Q. And you didn't owe him any money when you 
signed it, did you? 
A. No. 
MR. PATTON: Thank you. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CHUNTZ: 
Q. Mr. Patton was asking you about improvements 
that you made to the property, or that were made to 
the property during the 12 plus years that you've 
lived there. Was anything done to the roof? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was done to the roof? 
A. The whole entire roof was shingled. 
Q. Was there any painting done to the property? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. What was painted, inside or out? 
A. Inside and -- the house is brick, so all the 
trim was painted, and the porch railings, and inside 
rooms have been painted because I asked my son to help 
me paint. 
Q. Now Mr. Patton was asking you some questions 
about insolvency. At the time in August of 1996 when 
you deeded the property to your son, did you owe 
anybody any money at that time? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you have any bills that were 
outstanding? 
A. No. 
Q. And you were able to pay for your living 
expenses between what you got from Social Security and 
what Mr. Bradford provided? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Patton asked you about a time in July 
when Mr. Bradford came home and there were some 
engineers at the house. Were the engineers at the 
house concerning condemning the house? 
A. NO. 
Q. Was there any discussion at all at that time 
or at any time about tearing the house down? 
A. No. 
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Q. Were you and Mr. Bradford planning and 
working on developing the property? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You were planning on selling it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Could the property have been developed 
without tearing down the home? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When Mr. Patton was asking you about this 
July argument, you had wanted to tell the Court 
something about this argument or arguments. Why don't 
you tell the Court about arguments with George. Did 
George and you have arguments often or not? 
A. Yes, very often. 
Q. About how often would you say that you and 
George had arguments? 
A. Out of a month's time, you mean? 
Q. Okay, out of a month's time. 
A. Every three days and more. 
Q. Did George ever talk about divorce during 
these arguments? 
A. He always threatened me with divorce if he 
didn't like the decisions I made for the property --
of repairing and any -- even the little things in the 
kitchen, if I threw kitchen garbage in the garbage and 
1 if I wanted to have a place to dump my garbage, he 
2 always went into ranting and raving and rages --
3 violent rages to me all the time. 
4 Q. Did he raise the issue of divorce during 
5 these times? 
6 A. Yes, every time he threatened me with 
7 divorce when I wouldn't agree with the way he wanted 
8 things done. 
9 Q. So divorce was a regular and common subject 
10 in your household? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. And what was your reaction to these threats 
13 of divorce? 
14 A. At first I was frightened, but he always 
15 ended up saying that he was sorry after, and he would 
16 always apologize and be -- lived like civil together, 
17 and so I never paid much attention after that because 
18 he was always threatening me and then never doing 
19 anything, so I just assumed that we never would ever 
20 be divorced. 
21 Q. Did you take his threats of divorce 
22 seriously? 
23 A. Never after so many times, no. 
24 Q. Did you make plans or take actions on the 
25 basis that when he told you he was going to divorce 
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you that you better do something about that? 
A. No. 
Q. This argument that Mr. Patton refers to that 
occurred in July of 1996, did George threaten to 
divorce you at that argument? 
A. Yes, he was constantly threatening me around 
that time. 
Q. And did things get resolved between you and 
he after that argument? 
A. Yes, we still--
Q. Did he go back to being civil? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Between that July argument and when you 
deeded the property -- quit claimed the property to 
your son in August, was he still threatening to 
divorce you during this time? 
A. (No response) 
Q. Let me ask you a different question. Were 
you and Mr. Bradford continuing to attempt to develop 
the property after the July argument? 
A. Yes, we were always doing that. 
Q. And between this July argument and the day 
you deeded the property to your son, did Mr. Bradford 
tell you again that he was going to divorce you? 
A, What was that again? 
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Q. After the July argument, between that time 
and when you deeded you property in August to James, 
did Mr. Bradford, while you were continuing to try to 
develop the property, did he threaten to divorce you 
again? 
A. During the time we were developing he never 
ever mentioned divorce then. 
Q. Well, he mentioned it at this argument in 
July when you were developing it. 
A. Right, just because he was mad for that one 
day, yeah. 
Q. And then he let it go? 
A. Yes, because then it was just the same 
pattern, he just said he was sorry and apologized and 
then afterwards keep on talking about developing. 
Q. So when you deeded your property to James in 
August, you didn't do it because you were concerned 
about George's divorcing you? 
A. No. 
Q. You did it because you wanted to take care 
of the problem of if you died before George, George 
would get all of the property and your children would 
get nothing? 
A. Right. 
Q. Now there's been some suggestion that you 
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didn't do this deed to James for estate planning 
because you only gave the property to James and not to 
your other children. Why didn't you deed the property 
to your other children's names? 
A. Because my other four children are in 
another age bracket, they're ten years way over James, 
and they've already established themselves well in 
life, and they all own their own -- have their own 
home, and I wanted before I died to make sure that all 
my children had a home. 
MR. CHUNTZ: Thank you. 
MR. PATTON: First your Honor, let me submit 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2 for identification as 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2. It's her affidavit. 
MR. CHUNTZ: No objection, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Number 2 will be received. 
(Exhibit No. 2 received into evidence) 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PATTON: 
Q. First I want to make it clear in my mind, 
when you say you deeded to James Demita, you intended 
for him to get the entire thing. 
A. What entire thing? 
Q. Your half interest in that home. Isn't that 
right, just--
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A. Just whatever I owned, yes. 
Q. And so you didn't intend for your other 
children to get any of it? 
A. I know my children, and I know that if any 
of my any other children were in need that James would 
help them and give them whatever they needed. I know 
that. 
Q. But when you signed the quit claim deed it 
wasn't your intent that they each get the same amount, 
it was that it all go to him; is that what your 
testimony just was? 
A. Yes, because I know he would do the right 
thing with it. 
MR. PATTON: May I approach the witness, 
your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: At the deposition I asked 
you this question-. "Is there a reason you didn't quit 
claim to all of them?" And what was your answer? 
A. "Just to simplify it," like I said. 
Q. And then you went on, what did--
A. "I knew James would do the right thing and 
share and share alike." 
Q. And then my next question was, "Did you give 
him instructions to do that?" And what was your 
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answer? 
A, "I didn't need to. He told me that's what 
he would do." 
Q. So he told you he would share equally with 
his brothers and sisters? 
A. Only if there was a need. 
Q. Only if there was a need? 
A. But I didn't add that on there. That was--
MR. CHUNTZ: I'm going to object to this 
line of questioning, your Honor, I don't think it goes 
to anything that's relevant. 
MR. PATTON: They opened the door. 
THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead. 
MR. PATTON: No further questions. 
MR. CHUNTZ: Nothing further, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
(Court handles another matter) 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. PATTON: Your Honor, I would call George 
Bradford to the stand. 
COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the 
testimony you are about to give in this case now 
pending before the Court will be the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
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GEORGE BRADFORD 
having been first duly sworn, 
testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PATTON: 
Q. Mr. Bradford, I'm going to show you some 
documents that I've marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3 
for identification. It's just a packet of documents. 
THE COURT: Is this a courtesy copy? 
MR. PATTON: That's correct. 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: Mr. Bradford, will you 
please state your name for the record, please? 
A. George Roy Bradford. 
Q. Mr. Bradford, are you familiar with the 
property that we've been talking about here today, 
this home and land? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How are you familiar with it? 
A. That's where I was born and raised. 
Q. When you say were you born and raised there, 
what do you mean you were born and raised there? Were 
you actually born on that property? 
A. No, I was born in the old house that my 
father sold and moved up town. 
Q. Did that home used to be part of this 
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property? 
A. No. Yes, excuse me. 
Q. And the land that we're talking about, it's 
a home and how many acres? 
A. There's only 20 acres all together. 
Q. And the first Bradford that owned that home 
and acreage, who was that? 
A. Pleasant Sprague Bradford. 
Q. And who was that in relationship to you? 
A. My father's dad, my grandpa. 
Q. So your grandpa owned it originally? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then who owned it after him? 
A. My father, Roy Bradford. 
Q. And? 
A. Minnie Williams Bradford. 
Q. And then who owned it after them? 
A. I did. 
Q. And when did you get it? Did you get it 
before or after you married Andrea? 
A. It was before. 
Q. And when you married Andrea did you owe any 
money on that property? 
A. No. 
Q. I see you looking and thinking hard. Do you 
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have some trouble with your thought process on 
occasion? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why is that? 
A. Sometimes my mind goes almost blank, I 
can't--
Q. Did you ever have any accidents that has 
complicated this? 
A. When I was three I was kicked in the head by 
a horse --a colt, it wasn't a horse, and it seemed to 
slow my thinking a lot. 
Q. Can you tell the Court how much education 
you have? 
A. Well, I graduated from high school, 12 
years, and then I have -- after they closed the 
foundry down at Geneva they told us that we had an 
option of we could go take a class in UVSC in several 
different areas, auto repair or maintenance or 
mechanic. 
Q. So did you get that education? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How many additional years? 
A. I started in 1985 and it was a two year 
course. 
Q. Do you remember marrying Andrea in 1985? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Were you still working at Geneva when you 
married her? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And how long had you worked at Geneva? 
A. Total? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Twenty-two years something. 
Q. And so when you were with Andrea working at 
Geneva, when did you retire from Geneva? 
A. I believe it was 1986 that they ordered us 
off the property. 
THE COURT: Just a minute, let me make sure 
I'm clear. What did he start in 1985? You said he 
started in 1985. 
MR. PATTON: He married in 1985. 
THE COURT: I got that. 
MR. PATTON: And he started an educational 
program in 1985. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: You worked at Geneva a total 
of 22 years? 
A. And so many months, yes. 
Q. And you married Andrea in 1985? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And then you worked at Geneva another year 
before--
A. No -- well, it was close to a year because 
1986, I believe, was when they ordered us off the 
place. 
Q. So it was about a year. So out of the 22 
years that you worked there you were married to Andrea 
one year? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. I'm going to ask you to look at the very 
first document on top that you've got there. It's a 
document entitled, "Order of Dismissal," and it 
purports to be a divorce action George Bradford and 
Andrea Bradford, just the very first page, don't turn 
back, very first page. Do you remember filing a 
divorce action against Andrea in 1992? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was--
A. Okay. 
Q. And that was dismissed in 1993 in February; 
is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you and Andrea decided to try and make 
your marriage work; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Did you continue to have arguments and 
discussions about divorce? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you continue to have arguments and 
discussions about divorce up until the time you filed 
this divorce action? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you remember an argument that you had 
with Andrea in July of 1996? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And was that at your home? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was it like all of the other arguments or 
was it smaller or was it bigger? 
A. It was bigger. 
Q. Why was it bigger? 
A. Because I had a feeling that those engineers 
were down there for a purpose, and--
Q. For what purpose did you think they were 
there for? 
A. To condemn the place. 
Q. And when you argued with Andrea that day, 
how long did that argument last? 
A. Well, I worked at the school, and I don't 
get off until about 4 -- it must have been off and on 
40 
the rest of the day. 
Q. Did you hear Andrea say that that argument 
sort of slopped over --in other words, it was around 
that time --in other words it wasn't just that day, 
but it was actually around that time. Do you recall 
that happening? 
A. Yes, around that day? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you argue about anything other than just 
the fact that the people were there, or did you argue 
about anything else, too? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you argue about Mr. Demita? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was that argument about? 
A. That he wasn't living up to the verbal 
agreement that we made, and that he -- I wanted him 
out of there. 
Q. You wanted him out of where? 
A. Out of the place, out of the home because of 
his long stay, that he had already been there. 
Q. And what verbal agreement wasn't he living 
up to? 
A. We made a verbal agreement that he would pay 
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all the utility bills and he never did, he only paid 
for the first three months, and then after that I paid 
them. 
Q. When was that agreement made? 
A. In December of 1985. 
Q. In December of 1985? 
A. I mean December of 1995, excuse me. 
Q. So he moved in in December of 1995? 
A. No, he lived there in -- he moved in 
December of 1995. 
Q. Did he bring anyone with him? 
A. No. 
Q. Did he have his son with him? 
A. No. 
Q. But did he have an agreement to pay 
utilities? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How many months did he pay utilities? 
A. Three months. 
Q. And then what happened? 
A. And then I paid them from then on. 
Q. Did there come a time that his son started 
living with you, too? 
A. Well, after he was born, yes. 
Q. When was that? 
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A. Well, he's 11 now, so it's been 11 years 
ago. 
Q. Now in the July argument it's your testimony 
that you told your wife you wanted Mr. Demita out of 
that house? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Had you and your wife and Mr. Demita, had 
you guys talked about trying to develop the property 
part of that? 
A. What day are we using? 
Q. July of 1996 when you have the fight, prior 
to July of 1996 -- when the engineers w ere there, 
prior to that date had you and she and Mr. Demita 
talked about developing that property? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Had you talked about selling the home or 
bulldozing the house down? 
A. No. 
Q. What was the agreement in terms of 
developing the house? 
A. Well, it started out with two other 
developers that were interested in it, and it fell 
through, so James claimed he could do it himself, so I 
wanted to have it developed. I accepted until I found 
out later that none of the stuff that he was telling 
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me was true. 
Q. Was there a reason the property in the back 
of your home couldn't be developed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was the problem? 
A. It was on a flood plain, mostly, and that 
there was no access to it -- the code of the city 
required you to have 160 some-odd feet to get to the 
property, and there wasn't--
Q. You say 160-odd feet, is that 160-odd feet 
on a city road? 
A. Yes, for a city road, a double lane road 
going down. 
Q. And was there 160 some-odd feet? 
A. No, sir, there wasn't. 
Q. Was there 160 some-odd feet if the house was 
taken down? 
A. Yes. No, no, excuse me, there wasn't 
because -- I'm not sure of the width of the place, I 
think it's 13 0 some-odd feet. 
Q. Did you ever agree that the house would be 
taken down? 
A. No. 
(Direct testimony of Mr. Bradford by Mr. Patton 
continues. Certain portions extracted) 
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Q. BY MR. PATTON: Other than the thousand 
dollars you took out and $700 you took out, since this 
divorce has been pending have you taken any other 
money out of your savings or IRA, that you're aware 
of? 
A. No. 
Q. Not that you're aware of? 
A. Not that I'm aware of, no. 
Q. Have you made additional contributions to 
it? Do you put money in each month? 
A. No, I just barely have enough to pay the 
bills, utility bills. 
Q. The next document claims it's a warranty 
deed. 
A. Yes. 
Q. It says it's a warranty deed and it's dated 
November 1989, and it purports to be a deed 
transferring property to you and Andrea as husband and 
wife with full rights of survivorship and not as 
tenants in common. Is that the deed that you signed 
that transferred the property to you and Andrea? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then the next page is a document 
entitled, "Quit Claim Deed," and that's the document 
that purports that Andrea transferred it to Mr. 
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Demita. Were you aware that she had done that? 
A. No, sir, I wasn't. 
Q. How did you become aware of the fact that 
she had done that? 
A. Through my daughter. 
Q. How did your daughter tell you? 
A. My lawyer asked for a copy of the deed, and 
my daughter went to the courthouse to get it and then 
she found out that this had been done. 
Q. When you say the deed, you didn't mean the 
quit claim deed, did you? 
A. No. 
Q. You mean the deed transferring it to you and 
Andrea? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you weren't aware that there had even 
been a quit claim deed? 
A. No. 
Q. And when did you find out there had been a 
quit claim deed? 
A. When my daughter, Phyllis, told me. 
Q. Do you know about what year that was, was it 
in 1996, was it in 1997? 
A. It happened in 1997. 
Q. Was that at or about the time you filed for 
1 divorce, was it about the same time? 
2 A. Yes, about the same. 
3 MR. PATT0N: Your Honor, we would submit 
4 Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3 for identification as 
5 Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3. 
6 MR. CHUNTZ: I have no objection, your 
7 Honor. 
8 THE COURT: Three will be received. 
9 (Exhibit No. 3 received into evidence) 
10 Q. BY MR. PATTON: Mr. Bradford, did you hear 
11 the statements that were made by your wife here today1: 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Do you agree with all those statements? 
14 A. No, I don't. 
15 Q. Do you think she's misrepresented some of 
16 the facts to the Court? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. If you were to tell the Court what you 
19 believe the real problem in your marriage to Mrs. 
2 0 Bradford is, what would you be telling him you think 
21 the real problem in the marriage is? 
22 A. Having her son living with us and his son. 
23 Q. Were you residing in Utah County for three 
24 months immediately prior to the commencement of this 
25 action? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And were you a resident of Utah County? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And in your complaint for divorce you've 
alleged that there are irreconcilable differences 
between you and she; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And are there in fact irreconcilable 
differences? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And are those differences Mr. Demita? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And his continuation in the home? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And as a result of that are you requesting 
the Court to award you a divorce? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And if the Court awards the divorce, are you 
asking the Court to set aside the transfer from your 
wife to Mr. Demita -- set that aside and say it 
belongs to you and she? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then are you asking the Court to award 
the property to you as your premarital property? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. I want to make it clear, and I want to be 
fair to her and I want to be fair to you and I want to 
be fair to the Court -- the improvements, the furnace, 
the sewage system, the painting, the other things that 
she described, where did the money come from that 
those things were paid for? 
A. Out of my pocket. Like I say, I had to use 
up that sub that had collected at Geneva before I was 
eligible -- before I could get any pension from them 
or before I was able to even start the rule of 65, 
that had to be used up first, she told me, the lady 
over at Geneva. 
Q. If the Court orders that we can't set aside 
the deed, are you asking the Court to let you purchase 
Mr. Demita out? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you need 90 to 120 days to do that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you understand if the Court does that 
and you can't, that the Court's likely to say that Mr. 
Demita can purchase you out? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you have any reason to disbelieve that 
the home and the property is worth $180,000, less the 
$9,000 to fix the tanks? 
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A. (No response) 
Q. Remember the appraisals we both--
A. Yes. 
Q. And both appraisals were for $180,000, 
weren't they? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then there's the tank issue and it's 
going to cost $9,000 to remove them, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If they're removed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you believe they need to be removed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you hear your wife testify that on the 
date she signed that quit claim deed to Mr. Demita she 
didn't owe him any money? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that true? 
A. I don't know about their financial business. 
From all that I know I don't think she owes him any. 
MR. PATTON: Thank you, no further 
questions. 
(Cross examination of Mr. Bradford beginning by Mr. 
Chuntz. Certain portions extracted) 
/// 
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CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CHUNTZ: 
Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Bradford. 
A. Good afternoon. 
Q. One little item that you were just 
testifying about when Mr. Patton finished with you was 
these items that were about your property, the 
motorcycle, some tanks, some things like that, that 
was all rusted out stuff that you actually helped Mr. 
Demita load onto a truck and take down to the scrap 
metal place? 
A. No, I didn't help him. 
Q. You didn't help him with that at all? 
A. No, I didn't. I dug that one out of the 
river, somebody had hauled it down there to the --
dumped some fill in the river, and I had dug it out 
there and hauled it up there, and it was clear out of 
sight. 
Q. But this was all old stuff. 
A. Well, does that matter how old it is, it's 
still important to me. That's all I wanted was the 
frame. 
Q. So it wasn't a matter of how much value it 
had, it had sentimental value to you? 
A. Well, it's just that I was going to use it 
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someday. I had high hopes of using it, not rebuilding 
the cycle, making another thing out of it, and I 
needed the frame to do it. 
Q. Now the tanks that are still buried on the 
property, they're still there now? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you haven't had to remove them anytime 
during the years that you've owned the property; is 
that correct? 
A. That's right, yes. 
Q. And nobody's told you that you had to remove 
them, have they? 
A. No. 
Q. As far as you know at this point in time 
there's no need to remove any of the tanks? 
A. I guess not if nobody demands that they be 
removed. 
Q. You got this property from your mom and dad? 
A. I inherited it, yes. 
Q. When you say you inherited it, they were 
alive when they deeded it to you, weren't they? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you got it by deed from them? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It was a gift? 
1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. At the time that they deeded this property 
3 to you --do you have brothers and sisters? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. How many? 
6 A. I have a brother and two sisters. 
7 Q. They didn't deed any part of this property 
8 to your brother and sisters, did they? 
9 A. Of the property that I have? 
10 Q. Uh-huh. 
11 A. No, but they were questioned about it if 
12 they wanted it, and they all refused it. 
13 Q. Your dad, he got the property from--
14 A. His father, yes, sir, Pleasant Sprague. 
15 Q. And his father deeded it to him alone, 
16 didn't he? 
17 A. From what I know. 
18 Q. And then later your dad added your mother's 
19 name after they got married, your dad added your 
20 mother's name to the property; is that right? 
21 A. I don't know, I just know her name was on it 
22 with dad's on the deed. 
23 Q. But originally it was deeded -- let me show 
24 you this and ask if you've ever seen this document. 
25 A. No, I've never. 
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Q. Is that a deed to the property? 
MR. PATT0N: Objection, he's indicated he's 
never seen it before. I don't think he knows. 
THE COURT: Sustained as to the form of the 
question. 
THE WITNESS: Dora Hansen, that's my 
father's mother. 
Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: Did she deed that -- does 
that deed deal with the property that you presently 
own? 
A. Let's see--
Q. Does that have the same legal description on 
it as the property that you presently own? 
MR. PATTON: Your Honor, maybe we could 
short circuit this. I'm not sure my client would 
know. I'm not sure he can read well enough --if 
counsel wants to bring it (inaudible) we might be able 
to stipulate. 
THE WITNESS: I've never read this before, I 
don't know -- it's new to me, no. Does this pertain 
to the property where we live? 
MR. PATTON: Your Honor, counsel has two 
documents, and maybe if he would just proffer what 
they are, it might save us some time because I don't 
think I'd object to them. We've already agreed that 
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documents like this could come in and we would save 
bringing people in to testify, and I'm not sure my 
client knows. 
THE COURT: State your proffer. 
MR. CHUNTZ: I have a deed -- all of these 
deeds deal with the subject farm, the legal 
descriptions are the same. I have a deed from Dora 
Hansen. 
Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: Was Dora Hansen your 
grandmother? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the deed deeds the subject property to 
Roy Bradford, and that's your father, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then subsequently I have a deed from Roy 
Bradford to Roy and Minnie Bradford as joint tenants, 
and Minnie Bradford is your mother? 
A. Yes, sir. 
MR. PATTON: We wouldn't have any dispute 
that those are the documents (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Have them marked and they'll be 
received. 
Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: You have filed for divorce 
previous to this time against Mrs. Bradford, haven't 
you? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. That was in 1992? 
A. 1992, yes. 
Q. And you were the one that filed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then you had that divorce dismissed, 
didn't you, in February of 1993? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You've indicated already that you had 
several discussions -- frequently discussed divorcing 
Mrs. Bradford with her over the years that you were 
married; is that true? 
A. Off an on, yes. 
Q. How often did that happen? 
A. Maybe every other month or more often, I 
don't -- I'm not sure. 
Q. Maybe even more often than that? 
A. Yes, on times. 
Q. So divorce was a frequent conversation 
around your home, wasn't it, but you didn't act on it 
very often, did you? 
A. Not until this event took place that really 
stirred me up. 
Q. What stirred you up the first time? Why did 
you file for divorce the first time in 1992? 
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1 A. My wife was stepping out on me. 
2 MS. BRADFORD: That's his first wife, not 
3 me. 
4 THE WITNESS: In 1992, excuse me. 
5 Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: In 1992. Why did you file 
6 for divorce from Andrea in 1992? 
7 A. I really don't remember right now. I can't 
8 remember. 
9 Q. You married Andrea in 1985? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. And then in 1989 you gave her the subject 
12 property in joint tenancy; is that right? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. You gave that to her as a gift, didn't you? 
15 You wanted her to have--
16 MR. PATTON: Objection, that calls for a 
17 legal conclusion. I think he can ask if he signed it, 
18 I think he can ask why, but if he wants my client to 
19 give a legal conclusion, your Honor, I think that 
20 that's an (inaudible) my client may not understand 
21 that term. I think he's already explained why he gave 
22 it to her and why he did it. There's a difference 
23 between saying that and saying it's a gift. 
24 THE COURT: Sustained. 
25 Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: You were happy with Andrea 
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in 1989; 
A. 
Q. 
property 
1 A. 
Q. 
A. 
were you not? 
Yes, 1989, yes. 
At the time when you deeded the real 
over to her--
Half, yes. 
You were happy? 
Yes. 
Q. 
time? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
parents 
Did you want to take care of her at that 
Yes. 
Did you love her at that time? 
I must have, yes. 
Do you remember at about that time your 
deeding some property over to you and she, 
their property? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
At 245? 
Pardon? 
Their property? 
Their property. 
At 245 South Main? 
I think so. 
Yes. 
And they deeded that over to you and to 
Andrea as joint tenants with rights of survivorship; 
is that correct? 
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A. I don't know how it read, I didn't--
Q. But it was to you and Andrea? 
A. Yes. Andrea's name was added later, yes. 
Q. And you didn't try to dissuade them from 
doing that? You didn't try to convince them not to 
put her name on their property, did you? 
A. No. 
Q. Because you wanted Andrea to have that as 
well with you? 
A. No. 
Q. You didn't? 
A. Not necessarily. My father put Andrea's 
name on it. 
Q. Why did he do that? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Did you try to talk him out of it? 
A. No. 
Q. This was at a time when--
A. Ke had deeded it to me first, and then after 
we were married he added her name onto it, I didn't 
know it. 
Q. You didn't know it? 
A. Until she told me. Then the State took it 
from us because of a shortage of time. 
Q. Let me show you this document, the warranty 
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deed. Is this the property that your mom and dad own 
in Spanish Fork? 
A. At 245, where is that? 
Q. I don't know that there's an address on it. 
A. I guess if it's up in town, nine rods south. 
Q. Did they own any other property in town? 
A, No. 
Q. And this is your mother and father's names? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So they were the owners of the property back 
in March of 1989? 
A* Yes. 
Q. Who did they deed this property to? 
A. George Bradford and Andrea Bradford, husband 
and wife. 
MR. CHUNTZ: May I have this marked? I move 
to admit Exhibit 6. 
THE COURT: Any objections? 
MR. PATTON: No, I'd like counsel to lay a 
little more foundation. I'm not sure my client 
understands what it was. Again, this is the type of 
document counsel and I talked about, we're not going 
to object and bring a lot of people in. 
THE COURT: Is it at 245 South? 
MR. CHUNTZ: Yes, I believe it is. 
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MR. PATTON: No objection. 
THE COURT: It will be received. 
(Exhibit No. 6 received into evidence) 
Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: So your parents deeded that 
property to you and Andrea, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you didn't try to talk your mom or dad 
out of doing that? 
A. No, sir, we tried to -- not we -- I tried to 
talk to them that they ought to deed that place to 
somebody or else the State's going to end up with it. 
Q. And so they deeded it to both you and she? 
A. Too late. We hadn't had it in our names 
for -- I believe the time was 33 months, and we only 
had it 11 months in our name, and dad was in a rest 
home and as soon as mother passed away the place filed 
back to dad in his name, and the State said we had to 
sell it or get -- they just told us we had to sell it 
in order for dad to stay in the rest home. 
Q. Was Andrea taking care of your parents at 
that time? 
A. Off and on, yes. I stayed with mother quite 
a bit at nights. 
Q. You did? 
A, Yes, while dad was in the rest home or while 
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she was alone. 
Q. She was down there taking care of your mom 
during the day? 
A. At times, not all the time. 
Q. In February of 1996 you were interested in 
selling the subject property, weren't you? 
A. 1996? 
Q. 1996. You entered into a real estate sales 
agreement with a Mr. Mullen, GM Development? 
A. I didn't. 
Q. You didn't? 
A. Is that the one that -- okay, it was with 
David Gardner and it fell through? 
Q. Let me show you, I believe it probably is, 
and I'll show you a document marked Exhibit 7, and let 
me ask you if--
A. That's my--
Q. Is that your signature? 
A. Yes. So is that the agreement that was--
Q. Do you remember what that is? Do you recall 
that agreement? 
A. No, but I signed it. 
Q. Do you recall entering into an agreement 
with GM Development and Mr. Mullen? 
A. Well, it's just one that Jim had us sign. 
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Q. Do you remember getting $10,000 earnest 
money on the agreement? 
A. He said something about it, but I never did 
get it, no. 
Q. The agreement that you recall, did that fall 
through? 
A. Yes. This one? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes. 
Q. It fell through? 
A. It didn't go through, yes. 
Q. And you had to give back the earnest money? 
A. I never did see it. 
Q. Do you recall this Exhibit marked No. 8? 
Your signature's on that. 
A. What's this on? 
Q. This is an escrow agreement whereby you 
instruct the title company to return the $10,000 to GM 
Development. 
A. Yes, he said something about -- Jim 
explained something about that if they didn't do it in 
so many months, I believe, that you had -- that they 
were -- I didn't have to pay it; is that right? 
Q. So you signed that agreement? 
A. Yes, that's my signature. 
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received 
(Exhibit 
Q. 
through, 
MR. 
MR. 
THE 
NOS. 
BY 
you 
! didn't you? 
A. Yes 
CHUNTZ: 
PATTON: 
COURT: 
7 and 8 
I move to admit 7 and 8. 
No objection. 
Seven and eight will be 
received into evidence) 
MR. CHUNTZ: 
still wanted 
So after that deal fell 
to develop the property, 
and no because of the funny stories I 
was getting back from the way the city was accepting 
it when the city hadn't accepted it at all. 
Q. Let me show you what's been marked as 
Exhibit 9 and ask you if your signature appears on 
this document. 
A. Yes. 
Q. That document is entitled a "Contract?" 
MR. PATTON: Your Honor, I don't have any 
objection if he stands next to my client and points to 
the document and help my client find those things. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. CHUNTZ: I'm going to give him an 
opportunity to read it, see if he recalls it. 
THE WITNESS: Yes, I remember it. 
Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: This is an agreement that 
you entered into with your wife and James Demita? 
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A. Yes, this is the one that I should have 
talked to my attorney about and I didn't. 
Q. And this is an agreement that was putting a 
prior oral agreement in writing? 
A. It says yes, 25 percent. 
Q. James was going to get 25 percent, wasn't 
he, of the property? 
A. That's what it says on here, yes, value of 
the lot, yes. 
Q. So you were willing to transfer a portion of 
the proceeds from the sale of those lots--
A. This was if he developed it, which he never 
did. 
Q. I understand, but you were willing to--
A. Well, why is it still in force? 
THE COURT: Just a minute, sir. Please 
answer the questions. 
Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: You were willing to go 
forward with this transaction? 
A. Yes, if he developed it. 
MR. CHUNTZ: I move to admit No. 9. 
MR. PATTON: No objection. 
THE COURT: Number 9 will be received. 
(Exhibit No. 9 received into evidence) 
Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: That was in -- you entered 
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into that agreement in late April of 1996, right? 
A. What's the date on it, I don't know. 
Q. That's what it says, April 26th. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Did the three of you continue with 
development activities, trying to get the property 
developed? 
A. No, I think shortly after that I stopped it. 
Q. Did you? When did you stop it? 
A. When I found out what he was doing to me. 
Q. When was that? 
A. A little past this date that was on there. 
Q. A little past, is that a few days, a few 
weeks, a few months? 
A. I don't know when it was. As soon as I 
found out from the city that none of this stuff had 
been passed through that he said had been all voted 
on. Nothing had been passed by the city, that's what 
they told me. 
Q. Let me show you what's been marked as 
Exhibit 10. Do you recognize that document? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What's River and Park View Estates? 
A. That's the name we agreed on. 
Q. What is the document? 
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A 
Q 
What is the document? 
Yes. Have you ever seen this or something ' 
like this before? 
A 
Q 
A 
had --
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
surveys 
A. 
Q 
A. 
Q. 
This document? 
Yes. 
Yes, I guess. This is the one that they 
he had LEI map out. 
Who's "he?" 
James. 
Did you hire LEI? 
No, I didn't. 
Did you have anything to do with LEI? 
No. 
How about paying them for their services? 
Yes. 
You paid them for their services? 
After this was all mapped out, yes. 
You knew they were doing that, right? 
Yes. 
Do you remember having the whole property 
d^? 
By LEI? 
Yes. 
Yes. 
And did you talk with LEI about any of this 
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development or mapping out the property? 
A. No. 
Q. The date on Exhibit 10 shows 6/96. Is that 
when LEI did its work? 
A. I can't tell you that -- yes, if that's the 
date on it. 
Q. Do you have a recollection yourself? 
A. No, I don't. If that's when it's dated, 
that's when they did the work, I guess. 
MR. CHUNTZ: I move to admit 10. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. PATTON: And 10 was the topographical 
map? 
MR. CHUNTZ: Yeah, the plat map. 
MR. PATTON: No objection. 
THE COURT: Ten will be received. 
(Exhibit No. 10 received into evidence) 
Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: Exhibit 11 consists of two 
checks for the -- copies of the two checks. Do you 
recognize these two checks? 
A. No, I don't. That's not my writing. 
Q. That's not your writing? 
A. No. 
Q. Is this your signature down in here? 
A. This is mine, yes. 
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Q. That's your signature down in here? 
A. Yes. 
Q. These are checks to whom? 
A. LEI Engineers. 
Q. What are the dates on the two checks? 
A. June 1st of 1996 and June 17th of 1996. 
Q. And are there notations on those checks as 
to what these payments were for? 
A. Subdivision, yes. 
Q. These had to do with the subdivision? 
A. That's what it says on here, yes. 
Q. And you signed these checks? 
A. I must have, that's my signature, yes. 
Q. But you don't recall now being involved with 
LEI and what they were doing? What are the dates on 
the two checks? 
A. One is the 1st of June and the other is the 
17th. 
Q. Of June? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Both in 1996? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you were paying money to LEI, signing 
checks, but you didn't know what they were doing? 
A. Okay, this one was on the --he said that 
69 
this on the -- when they mapped it out for $1400. 
Q. And is that the subdivision plot, Exhibit 10 
that I just showed you? That's what that was for when 
they mapped it out? 
A. I think so. 
Q. And did you get to see that at the time it 
was done? 
A, Showed us that, yes. 
Q. So you did see it and you paid for it? 
A. Yes. 
MR. CHUNTZ: We move to admit Exhibit 11. 
MR. PATTON: No objection. 
THE COURT: Eleven will be received. 
(Exhibit No. 11 received into evidence) 
Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: In June of 1996 you were 
still working on the project, weren't you? 
A. It looks like it, yes. When was this 
that -- the question before that, what was it you 
asked about, if you remember. 
Q. If I remember I'll ask it again. I'm sorry, 
I don't remember. Let me show you Exhibit 12. Do you 
remember getting this bill from LEI? 
A. This is that $1400. 
Q. I think that's a different $1400. 
A. No, I only paid them once, didn't I? 
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Q. Well, I think not. If it will help--
A. I made two checks after that $1400? 
Q. Let me show you Exhibit 13, and ask you if 
your signature appears at the bottom of this. 
A. Yes, that's it. 
Q. That's it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That's another check for $14 05, that's the 
amount of this invoice, right? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. What's the date on the invoice? 
A. This is in September. 
Q. This is in September, in fact it's September 
3 0th that you paid it; isn't that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you were still working with LEI in 
September of 1996? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Working on developing this property? 
A. It looks like it. 
MR. CHUNTZ: I move to admit 12 and 13. 
MR. PATTON: No objection. 
THE COURT: Twelve and thirteen will be 
received. 
(Exhibit Nos. 12 and 13 received into evidence) 
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Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: Let me show you Exhibit No. 
14. Is your signature there on this one? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And this one is made out to Newman Bundy? 
A. Yes, I owed him $500. 
Q. He delivered some dirt to the property, 
right? That was part of the development of the 
property, wasn't it? 
A. No, that was part of the -- just to fill up 
the land, and they had some dirt they wanted to get 
rid of. 
Q. But you needed the dirt to fill in the land? 
A. Yeah, we agreed that -- I agreed to buy it, 
yes. 
Q. And that was part of the development process 
that you were going through there in September? 
A. Yes, if that's what you want to call it, the 
development project. Yeah. 
MR. CHUNTZ: I move to admit 14. 
MR. PATTON: No objection. 
THE COURT: Fourteen will be received. 
(Exhibit No. 14 received into evidence) 
Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: In fact, you were still 
going forward with the development of the project in 
trying to get in position to sell lots and trying to 
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have James work with the city all the way up until 
April of 1997, weren't you? 
A. I don't know, was it that late? 
Q. Do you remember talking to your daughter, 
Phyllis, and asking her to contact the city and find 
out what was going on? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was in about April of 1997? 
A. I don't know the time. 
Q. Let me show you Exhibit 15, it's the letter 
that Phyllis received. Did you ever get to see this? 
Look at that letter. Do you remember having a 
conversation with Phyllis about that letter or seeing 
that letter before? 
A. Just a minute. I don't remember, but this 
is the one that she we went to Comstock and received, 
yes. 
Q. Comstock, he's the planning--
A. Yes, engineer. 
Q. Planning engineer for Spanish Fork? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you ask her to go and see him? 
A. Yes, talk to him. 
Q. Why was that? 
A. Because all the stuff that he was telling me 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1C 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
that hadn 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
project? 
't been--
Are you talking about James Demita? 
Yes. 
So James was telling you things about the 
A. He was going to these council meetings, and 
he would come home and say, "Well, I can't believe how 
fast they accepted all these things, and it's all 
passed," and I went to Cornstock and he said no, it 
hadn't been passed by the city at all. 
Q. So you asked your daughter to talk to--
A. Talk to Comstock, yes. 
Q. And that was just before you got this 
letter? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So before you learned that, you were still 
moving ahead with James and--
A. Well, yes, I thought he was being truthful 
with me. 
Q. The three of you were still trying to 
develop the property to sell as late as April, and 
maybe even as late as May of 1997? 
A. I didn't think it was that late. 
Q. Well, the letter is May 5, 1997? 
A. May 5th, yes. 
1 Q. Then you got angry after you learned that 
2 James wasn't telling you the truth, right? 
3 A. Yes, I was angry before, too. 
4 Q. But you were willing to continue developing 
5 the property with him? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Then you went to see your lawyer after you 
8 got this letter -- saw this letter? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. And that's when you went to see him about 
11 getting a divorce, right? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. That's when you asked Phyllis to go over and 
14 check on the records to see who owned the property; is 
15 that right? 
16 A. No, I believe--
17 Q. Mr. Patton asked that? 
18 A. Wasn't it that way? 
19 MR. PATTON: Counsel, do you want me to 
20 testify? 
21 MR. CHUNTZ: No, it's all right. 
22 Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: Either you or Mr. Patton 
23 asked your daughter to go check on the records about 
24 the property? 
25 A. Get a deed for the property, yes, when she 
1 found out about that it had been done. 
2 MR. CHUNTZ: We move to admit 15. 
3 MR. PATT0N: Your Honor, I want to make my 
4 objection clear because I'm only objecting to the 
5 admission of 15 if it's being admitted for the 
6 purposes of what's stated in the letter. What's 
7 stated in the letter is hearsay, and so therefore I'm 
8 objecting to it being submitted for purposes of the 
9 truthfulness of the letter. 
10 However, if what he's submitting is to see 
11 that my client was aware of the letter and had 
12 received a copy of it, (inaudible) or at least seen a 
13 copy, I'm not objecting to that. But for purposes of 
14 the truthfulness of the letter itself, we object. 
15 MR. CHUNTZ: I'm not offering it for the 
16 subject matter of the letter. 
17 THE COURT: Okay, it will be received. 
18 (Exhibit No. 15 received into evidence) 
19 Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: During this whole period 
20 when you and James and Andrea were working on 
21 developing the property, you weren't contemplating 
22 divorce then, were you? 
23 A. I really can't say. 
24 Q. You hadn't gone to see a lawyer about 
25 getting a divorce, had you? 
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A. No. 
Q. You were still working with Andrea and James 
to get this property developed, weren't you? 
A. I must have. 
Q. That's what the documents seem to show, 
don't they? 
A. Yes. But I could begin to see what a mess I 
was getting in. 
Q. So you were beginning to see that you were 
not going to be happy? 
A. Yes, I was beginning to see that it wasn't 
his land, it was my land, I had to pay the consequence 
of what I gave him to do, and I paid the consequences 
of it. 
Q. So you weren't happy with the deal that you 
entered into with him? 
A. No, I wasn't. 
Q. You wanted to get out of that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But you still weren't looking to divorce 
Andrea at that point, were you? 
A. I don't know, there's been quite a few times 
it's come up. 
Q. Now you've got other real property -- real 
estate --in addition to the subject property here, 
77 
the marital home, don't you? 
A. The marital home? 
Q. Yeah, the place where you and Andrea lived. 
A. Yes, No, I don't, no. 
Q. You have some property in a place called 
Aspen Hills? 
A. No. What made you think I have property up 
there? That was dropped many years ago. 
Q. When was that dropped? 
A. I don't know, but I sold it -- I went up 
there and had that stopped a long time ago. When did 
I buy it? 
Q. Well, I know you had it at least back in 
1986, and in your answers to interrogatories back in 
August of 1997, you listed real property in Indianola. 
A. No, that's not mine. I don't have nothing 
up there. 
Q. You don't have anything up there, either? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. You did have property in Aspen Hills, 
though? 
A. No. I let that go a long time ago. If I 
still own it, it's never been paid for. 
Q. That would be a pretty good deal. I don't 
know if you own it or not. 
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A. I don't own it. 
Q. In 1996 and in 1997 Andrea didn't owe you 
any money, did she? 
A. No, I don't think so. 
Q. You've never claimed that she's owed you any 
money, have you? 
A. No. 
Q. You weren't demanding or insisting that --
in 1996 you weren't demanding her or insisting that 
she give you back the half of the property that you 
had deeded over to her, were you? 
A. You mean the property that she owned? 
Q. No, I'm talking about the farm, the subject 
property. You weren't asking or demanding that she 
give it back to you in 1996, were you? 
A. I could have been, yes. 
Q. You could have been? 
A. I wanted her to sign it back, I don't know 
what year it was. 
Q. But you and she were trying to develop it in 
1996? 
A. No, it wasn't then, it was before then. 
Q. You were aware in 1996 that if you died 
before Andrea did, that she would get all of the 
property and your kids wouldn't get any of it, weren't 
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you? 
A. No, I wasn't. 
Q. You weren't aware of that? 
A. No. My understanding was that it would go 
half. 
Q. You hadn't talked with anybody about what 
joint tenancy meant? 
A. No. Joint tenancy, that would mean both of 
us, wouldn't it? 
Q. Did your daughter ever talk with you about 
what would happen if you died, what would happen to 
the property? 
A. No. 
Q. She never talked with you about it? 
A. My daughter? 
Q. Yes, your daughter, Phyllis. 
A. She might have, I don't remember. 
Q. You don't remember her ever talking with you 
about getting the property taken out of joint tenancy 
so that she could get half of the property? 
A. No. 
Q. That wasn't a concern of yours? 
A. Well, no, I don't think it was, not right 
then. When was this? 
Q. 1996. 
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A. I can't remember. 
Q. What do you remember about it? 
A. Talking to her about it, the property. 
Q. What do you remember about that? Did you 
ever have a concern that Andrea would get all of the 
property if you died first? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. You never worried about that? 
A. Well, I signed it expecting that -- her name 
on there expecting that she would only get half of it. 
Q. And that was your intention, wasn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I want to take a look at part of Exhibit 3 
with you, your financial declaration. Let me show you 
where I'm looking. You've indicated here that your 
gross income from your employment is $638, and that 
your net income is $410; is that right? 
A. Yes, pretty close. 
Q. And the amount that--
A. That's an average of the whole year. 
Q. And the average of the deductions that are 
coming out are listed down here, $60 for federal and 
state tax, right? 
A. Just the state, the federal wasn't taken 
out. 
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Q
* 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
There was nothing taken 
Not at the school, no. 
$35 per month for FICA, 
Yes, they take that out 
$8 per month for--
out? 
Social Security? 
automatically. 
A. This is medical insurance. 
Q. That's the $165. 
A. That's Geneva. 
Q. You're right. And then you have this $105 
that you've listed as a deduction, and that's 
(inaudible)? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That's a savings account, isn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You put that in every month? 
A. Yes, they take it out, yes. 
Q. And you're still taking that out every 
month; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So really what comes out of this $63 8 every 
month for taxes are the $103 that go to governments, 
right, the $6 0, the $3 5 and the $8? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the rest just goes into an account --
the $105 goes into an account for you; is that 
1 correct? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. It's $105 to (inaudible), that goes to you? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. So if we take that $103 for taxes off of the 
6 $638, we're left with $535 a month that you've got in 
7 disposable income after taxes from your employment? 
8 A. Wait, now I don't understand. 
9 Q. Let me point it out. 
10 A. All of these are taken out in taxes from 
11 there down to--
12 Q. Well, (inaudible) isn't a tax, is it? 
13 A. No, but there down to there. 
14 Q. And $165 for your medical insurance--
15 A. That's Geneva. 
16 Q. That's for your medical, right? 
17 A. Medical, yes. 
18 Q. Taxes are $60, $35, and $8? 
19 A. Yes. 
2 0 Q. Unless counsel corrects me, I believe that 
21 adds up to $103. If you subtract $103 from the $638 
22 that should be $535. 
23 A. No. I'd be getting that much in cash? I 
24 don't get that much. 
25 Q. I know you don't because you put $105 into 
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(inaudible) . 
A. (inaudible) yes. 
Q. So this was $53 5, and then you told us that 
this is $329 for Geneva? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that's because $165 comes off of this 
$469, doesn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then you get $769 from Social Security? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And my calculator tells me that those three 
net amounts equal $633 as disposable income that you 
have every month. Does that seem right to you? 
MR. PATTON: Your Honor, if I may interject, 
I'm going to object just because of the nature of the 
conversation. I think we indicated in my client's 
direct testimony sometimes he has trouble, I think he 
explained why he had Phyllis trying to fill it out, 
because we had trouble with this and some of those 
numbers. 
I don't dispute, counsel, that in closing 
argument you can say "This number, if my addition is 
correct--" I think what he's asking my client to do, 
my client probably can't do without a calculator, and 
just physically can't answer the questions. I know 
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where (inaudible) is going, he has a right to answer 
it, the numbers are what they are, we don't dispute 
that. I think pursuing this is starting to reach the 
point of harassment of my client simply because he 
can't do the numbers in his head. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. CHUNTZ: That's all the questions I 
have. 
THE WITNESS: Can I ask you a question? 
MR. CHUNTZ: Maybe after court is over, but 
not at the present time. 
THE COURT: Mr. Patton, do you have any 
further inquiry of your client? 
MR. PATTON: Yes, your Honor. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PATTON: 
Q. Mr. Bradford, these documents, the contract 
with Mr. Mullen, the working up, the LEI, the 
surveyors, et cetera, did you do that or did Mr. 
Demita do that? 
A. He hired it done, yes. 
Q. And these documents, did you prepare them or 
did Mr. Demita prepare them? 
A. Jim. 
Q. And he brought them to you and had you sign 
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them? 
A. They billed -- whether they -- I got a note 
from them or whether they told Andrea, and Andrea told 
me that this is what I owe them, I don't know. 
Q. And you were trying to say something about 
Mr. Demita would get a percentage of the property if 
the property was actually sold or actually -- and you 
got cut off. What was your understanding of what 
would happen? 
A. That I would owe him 25 percent --it says 
on there on the document that I would owe him 25 
percent of each lot; was that the way it read? 
Q. What was your understanding? I'm not asking 
you what it read, I'm asking what your understanding 
of it was. 
A. That he would end up with a lot of money. 
Q. If it was developed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you expect that he would get half the 
property from Andrea and get an additional 25 percent? 
A. Yes, that's the way I figured it. 
Q. No, no, no. Mr. Bradford, listen to what 
I'm saying. At any of the time that you signed that 
25 percent contract that you were trying to develop, 
did you know that Andrea had already deeded over half 
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the property to him? 
A. Now when was this, what year? 
Q. 1996. Counsel asked you about trying to 
develop the property in 1996 and early 1997. Do you 
remember those conversations that he talked about? 
A. No, I don't really. 
Q. Do you remember counsel asking you about you 
and Mr. Demita and Andrea trying to develop the 
property from 1996 and in the first part of 1997? 
A. Yes. 
Q. During the period of time that you and Mr. 
Demita and Andrea were trying to develop the property, 
were you aware of the fact that Andrea had already 
deeded one-half of the property to Mr. Demita? 
A. No. Now this had happened -- when was this, 
August of 1996 that this happened, that she had--
Q. Well, I can't answer those. 
A. Okay, but it was early--
Q. When did you find out that Andrea had 
deeded--
A. When she had gone to the county to get a 
copy of the deed. 
Q. And who is "she" went to get a copy? 
A. That's Phyllis, my daughter. 
Q. So that would have been about the same time 
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you saw the letter from Spanish Fork; is that right? 
A. Oh, the one from Cornstock? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I never did see it, she took it right over 
to you, I believe. I don't remember seeing it. 
Q. The Comstock letter appears to be dated May 
5, 1997. About the time Phyllis got this letter, is 
that about the same time you found out that Andrea had 
deeded the property? 
A. It must have been, because that was in --
now what date was that? I'm getting --it was in 
August, wasn't it, that she had taken her son over 
there and did that? 
Q. Well, the document speaks for itself. I 
can't answer your questions. When you were dealing 
with Mr. Demita concerning the development of the 
property, were you trying to deal with him in any 
dishonest way? 
A. No. 
Q. When you deeded the property to Andrea, and 
when you were doing those things with Andrea, when you 
deeded it in both of your names, did you believe that 
you and Andrea would continue to be married? 
A. Yes. 
MR. PATTON: Thank you, no further 
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questions. 
MR. CHUNTZ: Nothing further, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may step down. Let's take a 
short break. 
(Short recess taken) 
MR. PATT0N: (Court already in session when 
recorder was turned on) Ms. Penner, who is here. I 
have primarily brought her, your Honor, to explain why 
my client didn't do so well explaining his numbers on 
his financial declaration. 
If she were called to testify she would 
testify that in fact sometimes her dad doesn't do real 
well with numbers, that she tried to assist him with 
the financial declaration concerning what his income 
sources were, and that some of the figures that we 
gave in Exhibit 3 were actually figures that she and I 
came up with working together, and to the best of her 
information we believe they're correct. I don't think 
counsel wants me to do anything other than just 
proffer that, and he can cross examine her if he 
wants. Is that correct, counsel? 
MR. CHUNTZ: Yeah, I don't have a problem 
with that, and I'm not going to cross examine her. 
THE COURT: All right, I'll accept the 
proffer. 
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MR. PATTON: With that, your Honor, we would 
rest. 
THE COURT: Mr. ChuntZ? 
MR. CHUNTZ: I call Andrea Bradford back to 
the stand. 
THE COURT: I just remind you that you're 
still under oath. 
ANDREA BRADFORD 
having been first duly sworn, 
testifies as follows.-
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CHUNTZ: 
Q. Mrs. Bradford, you've already stated your 
name for the record. What is your birthdate? 
A. January 1, 1933. 
Q. How old are you now? 
A. Sixty-five. 
Q. You've heard George testify. I believe his 
age is--
A. Sixty-three. 
Q. Are you presently employed outside of the 
home? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you worked outside of the home during 
the marriage? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. When you first married Mr. Bradford, what 
were you doing while George was at work? 
A. The first year and a half or so he was going 
full-time to work and full-time to school, and he came 
home about 1 in the morning and left again about 7 in 
the morning. So the rest of the time I was taking 
care of everything that needed to be taken care of 
with the house and the farm and the property all 
around the house there, the shed and everything, and 
all the people that would come and go, and the back. 
Q. And were you taking care of--
A. I was taking care of his mother and father, 
and also at that time his daughter was living with us 
with her new baby, and I was taking care of all of the 
cleaning and all of the shopping and the bills and the 
mail and everything that needed to be--
Q. How much time did you spend taking care of 
Mr. Bradford's parents every day on average? 
A. It would average out to be about four hours 
a day doing laundry--
Q. How many years did you do this? 
A. Pardon? 
Q. How many years did you do this? 
A. Since I got married in 1985 until they died. 
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Q. When did they die; do you recall? 
A. One died in -- I can't remember the exact 
year, I can't remember the years that they died, but 
it was at least eight or nine years. 
Q. Did you take employment outside of the home 
during the marriage? 
A. Whenever I felt that I could have a little 
opening to -- would be okay for me to leave long 
enough to earn some money, yes. 
Q. How much time did you work outside of the 
home during the marriage? 
A. Not very often because there was too many 
needs to be done at the household. 
Q. Can you average out either the total amount 
of time that you worked outside of the home during the 
marriage, or maybe an average per year, something like 
that if you can? 
A. About maybe in one year I would go in and 
out during that year maybe about three months of work. 
Q. Have you ever worked more than three months 
in a year's time since you were married to George? 
A. I don't remember, I don't think so. 
Q. Were most years less than three months? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you worked outside the home in the last 
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few years? 
A. Nothing at all, none at all. I was too busy 
working on the developing. It was a lot of work in 
the back, the clean-up. 
Q. You had a job -- you used to go to temporary 
services to get employment? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And what happened with those temporary 
services, what did they tell you? 
A. Well, I only could qualify for production 
work, and by doing production I acquired -- started to 
get carpal tunnel in my wrist, so that's another 
reason I needed to work just sporadically so I 
wouldn't ruin my wrist. 
Q. Was that why you were let go from your last 
job was because of the carpal tunnel? 
A. Yes, and also because they said that not 
to -- they had my name on their computer at SOS -- not 
to send me back to certain companies that told them 
not to send me into their company to work. 
Q. Did they tell you why they didn't want you 
back? 
A. That I couldn't focus as well. I needed 
to -- I couldn't focus to do the job. 
Q. Mrs. Bradford, do you recognize this as your 
1 financial declaration? 
2 A. Yes, I do. 
3 Q. I assisted you in filling this out? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. The document on page l shows that you get 
6 Social Security of $416 per month? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. You've indicated that's gone up a little 
9 bit? 
10 A. Now I only get $387 because now -- since 
11 that time I turned 65 on January 1st of this year, so 
12 now they take out $43. 
13 Q. If you'll turn to page 2, we've calculated 
14 you're taking home from your Social Security, your 
15 check is actually $3 72 a month? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. You've got debts that are listed there, one 
18 to Dr. Lynn Richards? 
19 A. Yes. 
2 0 Q. And one to another dentist? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Do you remember who the other dentist is? 
23 A. Dr. Kent Turner. 
24 Q. And you are paying on those? 
25 A. No, I was waiting to see who is going to 
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pay, because it's under George's -- at that time I was 
married to George, and he was billed for the bill. 
Q. And these debts are -- these doctors are 
being patient with you? 
A. Pardon? 
Q. These doctors are being patient with you 
right now? 
A. Yes, they are. 
Q. If you'll turn the page and look at No. 6 
where it lists all of your expenses, you've had a 
chance to review all of these expenses after we 
prepared the document; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it would be your testimony that these 
are the amounts that you are currently having to 
spend, with exception of the rent money and utilities? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you're not paying any rent because 
you're living in the marital home? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And you're not paying any utilities because 
Mr. Bradford was ordered to pay the utilities? 
A. That's right. 
Q. So once this divorce is over and you're 
living in your own place, or Mr. Bradford is no longer 
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living with you, you expect that you'll have to pay 
utilities in the amount of $120 a month? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So your monthly expenses without any rent --
paying any rent at all is still going to be $1150 per 
month? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you have available to you $3 72? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you requesting that Mr. Bradford 
continue paying you alimony? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you requesting that that alimony be in 
the amount of $600 per month? 
A. Yes. 
Q. There's been testimony that Mr. Bradford 
deeded over the marital residence joint tenancy 
interest to you in 198 9; is that correct? 
A. Yes, that's correct. 
Q. Did Mr. Bradford ever tell you why he did 
this? 
A. A few times. 
Q. What did he tell you? 
A. That I love you, that's why -- and I want to 
take care of you, I want you to have half. 
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Q. And you deeded your half of the property to 
James in 1996? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You've heard testimony here today about the 
bank accounts and retirement accounts and life 
insurance cash values that are in George's name. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you asking for half of the value of all 
of those assets? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. If the Court decides that your deeding the 
property to James was okay, are you asking for any 
portion of Mr. Bradford's half of the property? 
A. Absolutely no. 
Q. If the Court decides that you should not 
have deeded the property to James, do you want the 
Court to allow you to live in the home with your 
grandson and James? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If the Court decides that you should not 
have deeded the property to James, do you believe that 
you should be entitled to your half of the property? 
A. Yes. 
MR. CHUNTZ: That's all I have, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
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MR. PATTON: Yes, your Honor. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PATTON: 
Q. Mrs. Bradford, if the Court decides that Mr. 
Demita owns half the property --in other words he 
owns half and George owns half, if I'm correct, you're 
stating you agree that you don't own half of George's 
half; is that right? In other words, if it belongs to 
Mr. Demita and Mr. Bradford, you don't own any portion 
of Mr. Bradford's; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Do you own any part of Mr. Demita's if the 
Court says that? 
A. We're family. 
Q. Which means what? 
A. That we take care of each other. 
Q. So if the Court were to give half of this 
property -- determine that half of it belongs to Mr. 
Demita, you believe that Mr. Demita would take care of 
you? 
A. If I needed it, if I needed caring. 
Q. If the Court determined that Mr. Demita 
could purchase Mr. Bradford's interest out of the 
property, in other words he gets to purchase the 
property from Mr. Bradford and not Mr. Bradford from 
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Mr. Demita, would Mr. Demita continue to allow you to 
live there? 
A. If I asked him, yes. 
Q. And if you continued to live there you 
wouldn't have the $600 a month rent or mortgage 
payment, would you? 
A. No. 
Q. And on your financial declaration that you 
listed what your income is, you didn't list the $150 
that Mr. Demita gives you for child care, did you? 
A. It's not my child, though. 
Q. But wasn't your testimony this morning that 
he pays you $150 a month to watch his child? 
A. And I use it on his child, but it has 
nothing to do with my needs, though. That's just a 
child's needs being met, but my needs aren't met. 
Q. Can you tell the Court how long you've had 
this carpal tunnel problem? 
A. The last two years I haven't had it because 
I haven't gone to work because of that mostly. I 
didn't want to expound on it, you know, make it worse. 
Q. So you haven't done anything in the last two 
years to make that worse? 
A. Except for the work I did around the 
property. I've hurt myself different times working on 
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the property like a man. 
Q. But you were able to work around the 
property like a man, then? 
A. Well, at my own pace. At the factories they 
make you keep up with an assembly line, and then that 
aggravates the carpal tunnel where you can't stop and 
rest it. Days I didn't do things -- I didn't work 
every day like a man at the property, just when my 
health and strength would allow it. 
Q. Do you have problems focusing? I mean there 
was some comment about you had trouble focusing. Do 
you agree you have trouble focusing? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Andrea -- is it Andrea or Andrea? 
A. It doesn't matter. 
Q. If the Court concludes that Mr. Demita owns 
half the property and that Mr. Bradford owns half the 
property, he says that deed's valid, it's upheld, but 
then he decides that--
A. Who's "he?" 
Q. The judge. But then the judge decides or 
rules that it was a dissipation, that you didn't have 
any right to transfer the property away --in other 
words what I'm saying is he says the deed is valid, 
Mr. Demita owns the property or owns half of it, but 
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then he rules "Mrs. Bradford, you didn't have any 
right to transfer it, therefore you shouldn't have 
done that, and you owe Mr. Bradford half the value of 
that land," you would owe Mr. Bradford $60,000 or 
$70,000 minimum, wouldn't you? 
MR. CHUNTZ: Objection, I think it's calling 
for a legal conclusion. He's giving argument and 
asking her to--
THE COURT: Where are you headed with this, 
counsel? 
MR. PATTON: Your Honor, what I'm trying to 
establish is really that she doesn't have $60,000 or 
$70,000 worth of assets to pay my client, and that's 
clearly relevant because it goes to the issue of 
solvency, and it's one of the possibilities that this 
Court can issue a ruling on. 
This Court can conclude that the deed is 
valid, but it was a dissipation of assets, and as such 
therefore she has to pay that back to the marital 
estate, and at even the lowest figure I can come up 
with, taking out costs of sale, taking out having to 
repair the tanks, et cetera, she would still owe the 
marital estate $60,000 to $70,000. If you want me to 
ask it that way, I'll withdraw that question and say, 
"Do you have $60,000 or $70,000 worth of assets you 
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could pay the marital estate?" 
MR. CHUNTZ: And I would say asked and 
answered. If that's the question and that's where 
he's going with it, he put her through that whole 
rigamorole on direct examination when he had her up on 
the stand, and asked about every piece of property she 
had and how much value it was and --he already knows 
the answer. 
MR. PATTON: Are you stipulating she 
doesn't? 
THE COURT: Overruled, go ahead. 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: Andrea Bradford, do you have 
$60,000 or $70,000 worth of assets that you could pay 
back to the marital estate if that's what the Court 
orders you to do? 
A. Personally, no, but I possibly -- definitely 
could get it. 
Q. From where? 
A. That is my business. 
MR. PATTON: Your Honor, I'm going to ask 
you that you instruct her to answer. 
THE COURT: Please answer the question, 
ma'am. 
THE WITNESS: I have family. 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: So you would get that money 
102 
from the family? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you don't personally have those assets? 
A. No. 
MR. PATTON: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
MR. CHUNTZ: Nothing further, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
MR. CHUNTZ: Your Honor, could we have a 
five minute recess? I want to call Mr. Demita, but he 
needs to call his son. 
THE COURT: That's fine. 
(Short recess taken) 
THE COURT: Come forward and be sworn. 
COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the 
testimony you are about to give in this case now 
pending before the Court will be the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
JAMES DEMITA 
having been first duly sworn, 
testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CHUNTZ: 
Q. Please state your name for the record. 
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A. James A. Demita. 
Q. And where do you reside? 
A. 1100 South Main in Spanish Fork. 
Q. Who do you reside there with? 
A. My mother and step-father and my son. 
Q. You've heard testimony that your mother 
deeded you by quit claim deed all of her interest in 
the property where you reside; is that correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And that was in August of 1996? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you involved -- did you discuss this 
transfer of the property with your mother prior to its 
being deeded? 
A. Yes, most of the discussion was with you and 
my mother, but I discussed it with her as well. 
Q. Did you have a concern about what would 
happen to her share of the property if she died before 
Mr. Bradford? 
A. Yes, actually both sides of that coin 
because my mother didn't necessarily know if it was 
great to -- if Mr. Bradford were to die first then she 
would get it all, and she thought it would be more 
fair just to make sure both sides got half with how it 
stood, you know, Mr. Bradford got half, she got half, 
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so she just wanted to make sure that both sides of the 
family got their half instead of one getting it all 
and the other nothing. 
Q. You heard my questions and Mr. Bradford's 
answers about developing the subject property. 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long had he and you been talking about 
doing that, say before August of 1996? 
A. How many months before? 
Q. Yes. 
A. We initially started in approximately 
December of 1995, late December of 1995. 
Q. And then you went through assisting in 
getting these contracts drawn up and entered into? 
A. Well, I didn't draw the contracts up, I 
called around and tried to find people (inaudible) 
selling the land to be developed, I contacted 
different developers and saw if any of them would be 
interested in purchasing it, and then Mr. Mullen and 
Mr. Gardner had their attorney, I'm assuming --
actually Mr. Mullen's an attorney, from what I 
understand. 
Anyway, they provided the documents and then 
I had a friend that used an attorney up at Snow, 
Christensen, and Martineau in Salt Lake and he agreed 
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to look over the documents just in George and my 
mother's behalf, just to see if there was any problem 
with it or whatever, and he said they looked fine, so 
then they signed them. 
Q. As the property now exists, can it be 
divided into two equal parts in a partition? 
A. I don't think so. 
Q. Why not? 
A, Well, it's unique, it's got the river on one 
side and then you've got city ground on the other and 
then you have the house, so I don't really know how 
you could do it equitably, especially with the house 
on it. 
Q. Are you asking the Court to award the 
property be sold pursuant to the partition statute? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you willing to buy Mr. Bradford's share 
of the property for half of its appraised value? 
A. Yes. 
MR. CHUNTZ: That's all the questions 1 
have. 
Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: Let me ask you another 
question. If the property was placed on the market 
pursuant to the partition statute, would you be 
willing to take half of the higher amount if it would 
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sell for more than the appraised value? 
A. Why don't you just say that one more time. 
Q. If the property was put up for sale pursuant 
to the statute, and a buyer was willing to pay more 
than what it's been appraised for, would you be 
satisfied in taking your half? 
A. Sure. I'd prefer to keep it, obviously, 
because my son has been living there and I've been 
living there and my mom lives there. 
Q. So if somebody was willing to offer more 
than $180,000 for the property, would you be willing 
to try to match that offer? 
A. Yeah, I would try to do that because like I 
said, I would like to keep my son -- you know, we've 
been living there for awhile now and just keep things 
stable. 
MR. CHUNTZ: Thank you. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PATTON: 
Q. Mr. Demita, you're indicating that you would 
like to do that and buy my client out. Where are you 
employed? 
A. Pardon me? 
Q. Where are you employed? 
A. Well, I do independent consulting for a 
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computer store here in town. I'm working with other 
developers right now since I gained experience in 
developing land, and working with different projects 
in the valley right now, then I do a public community 
service, I write a column in the --a weekly column in 
the newspaper. 
Q. And from all these different things that you 
do, how much money did you earn last year? 
A. Well, last year I was developing with Mr. 
Bradford so I didn't earn very much. 
Q. How much did you earn? 
A. Less than $3,500. 
Q. So all of last year you earned less than 
$3,500? 
A. Yes and no. 
Q. How much did you earn in the tax year 1996? 
A. I'm sorry, I thought you said 1996. You 
said 1995? 
Q. No, last year was 1997. 
A. Right, so what are you asking? 
Q. Last year was 1997. 
A. Right. 
Q. How much did you earn in 1997? 
A. Less than $3,500. 
Q. How much did you earn in 1996? 
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A. I was working on land still, so it was less 
than $3,500. 
Q. And how much in 1995? 
A. Well, I was in school. 
Q. Which law school was it? 
A. In Oregon. 
Q. What was the name of the law school? 
A. Will (inaudible). 
Q. When this development discussion was going 
on, I believe your testimony was you were the one who 
was talking with the attorneys? 
A. I don't know what you mean by talking to the 
attorneys. Mr. Mullen is an attorney, one of the 
developers, and I spoke with him, yes. 
Q. I believe you spoke with somebody at 
Martineau in Salt Lake? 
A. Yes, some firm up in Salt Lake. My buddy 
that I met in law school said his family uses this guy 
and he would be willing to take a look at it for free 
and see how it looked, so I asked Mr. Bradford --
well, actually he didn't say free, he said a small 
fee, whatever his hourly fee is. So then I told Mr. 
Bradford and my mother and they said, "Yeah, go ahead 
and have him look at it." When I got up there he 
didn't charge, he just said, "It looks fine," and he 
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didn't charge. 
Q. So when you were going to do that you 
discussed that with your mother and Mr. Bradford? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Because they were involved with it and you 
wanted to be fair with them; is that right? 
A. Well, I just told them everything that was 
going on. 
Q. So you tried to be sure that they knew 
everything that was going on? 
A. At that point yes, definitely. 
Q. Are you the individual who prepared the quit 
claim deed that was signed by Andrea Bradford? 
A. I'm not sure if you mean prepared, I signed 
in the part where it was $10 -- the handwritten part I 
did. I didn't notarize it or I didn't sign her 
signature or anything. I just did the handwritten 
part that you can see on there. 
MR. PATTON: May I approach the witness? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: I'm going to show you my 
copy of Exhibit 1. 
A. Okay. 
Q. I'm going to show you what's been marked 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 16 for identification and ask 
110 
you if 
A. 
Q. 
you recognize that. 
Yes 
I'm 
, I do. 
going to 
highlighter and I want 
Plainti 
so you 
THE 
.ff's 1 
MR. 
THE 
know. 
COURT: ] 
PATTON: 
WITNESS: 
ask 
you 
you to take this 
to highlight--
Plaintiff s 
Wei] ., we're 
This says 
I'm sorry, I thought 
16, this : 
making a 
Plaintiff 
you were 
yellow 
Ls 
new--
rs l, just 
saying P-l 
here (inaudible) 16, sorry. 
THE COURT: Do you want to take this one? 
MR. PATTON: We have another copy -- no, 
we're not using Plaintiff's 1, we're now using 
Plaintiff's 16. 
THE COURT: What's the difference? 
MR. PATTON: (inaudible) mark it. 
THE COURT: Make sure that's--
COURT CLERK: I think we're using 
(inaudible). 
MR. PATTON: Yes, we are, this is the new 
one, 
THE COURT: Right, so that one--
MR. PATTON: That's 1. 
THE COURT: You lost me, why do we have two 
of the same deed? 
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MR. PATTON: Because this one will be 
different in just a second. This one will look 
different than that one in just a second. That's the 
one I'm going to have him mark. 
MR. CHUNTZ: If he's going to mark it I 
suppose it's okay. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: Will you highlight in yellow 
those portions that you printed in that document? 
A. Sure. 
(Witness marks document) 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: So those portions you've 
highlighted on Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 16 for 
identification are the portions that you wrote in? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now the legal description of the property, 
although it's typed, it actually looks like it's been 
xeroxed on there; is that correct? 
A. I believe so. The actual -- LEI, I think, 
is the one that provided the document. 
Q. LEI provided this document? 
A. Yeah, because they had it on file, so they 
said -- I don't know if they copied it or what they 
did to it, but they said, "Here's the document," and 
then I hand wrote the part you see that's in 
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handwriting, and then we went to the bank and an 
individual at Zion's Bank notarized it. 
Q. When you say "we" you mean you and your mom? 
A. Yes. 
MR. PATTON: Your Honor, we would submit 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 16 as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 
16. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. CHUNTZ: No objection. 
THE COURT: Sixteen will be received. 
(Exhibit No. 16 received into evidence) 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: I'm curious, Mr. Demita, if 
you had the document and you talked with Mr. Chuntz 
with your mom, or if you spoke with Mr. Chuntz and 
then you went and got the document, the quit claim 
deed, which occurred first? 
A. I didn't get the quit claim deed for some 
time after they discussed different options that she 
had before her. 
Q. My question is what was that some time, a 
week, two weeks? 
A. No, it was a few months. 
Q. A few months? 
A. Yeah, a few months. 
Q. So when she spoke to Mr. Chuntz about her 
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options on estate planning, that was several months 
before August? 
A. Well, I didn't say several, I said a few. 
Q. So it was a few months before August? 
A. It was in about April, I believe. 
Q. So that was in about April, and the quit 
claim deed was signed in August? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was the urgency to sign the quit claim 
deed in August if you had known about it since April? 
A. There is no urgency. 
Q. Was there any particular reason it wasn't 
typed, and it was handwritten instead of being typed? 
A. I didn't have a typewriter. 
Q. In August when the quit claim deed was 
prepared, how long after you got it from these people 
that you said had it and it was signed? 
A. Not too long, I can't remember exactly. 
Q. A day, a week? 
A. It was probably in the duration of a week or 
less. 
Q. My question is it's been since April, you 
get this document evidently right at the end of July 
or the first part of August, was there any 
conversations between you and your mom at or about 
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that time as to why it had to be done then and not 
later or not earlier? 
A. Like I said, I don't know what you mean by 
"had to be done." We never -- it didn't necessarily 
have to be done. That was just part of what she was 
discussing, and they said you can do a trust or you 
can quit claim it, and it's quicker, you don't have to 
have all the added fees and all that other stuff, and 
so there's no particular magical number about that 
date. That's just when it got signed. 
Q. The quit claim deed, the talking with the 
attorneys, the talking with LEI, et cetera, the reason 
that was done -- and I don't want to be rude to your 
mom and I don't want to be rude to Mr. Bradford, but 
it's fair for me to assume that they're not very 
sophisticated people in terms of those type of 
business dealings; isn't that true? 
A. I can't make a characterization like that. 
Q. Is it fair to say that you're more 
sophisticated than they are? 
A. I'm not going to say I'm better than 
somebody, okay? I'm not going to say I'm more 
sophisticated or I'm smarter than somebody else. I 
think everybody has a relative range of normality. 
Q. You have graduated from college? 
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A. Yes. That doesn't mean you're smarter. 
Q. I agree. And I don't know if you finished 
law school, but you at least had some training at law 
school? 
A. Sure. 
Q. I believe your previous testimony was when 
you were dealing with Mr. Bradford and your mom and 
doing these types of things, you were trying to be as 
open and honest with them as you could and keep them 
informed? 
A. Yes, absolutely. 
Q. But you didn't inform Mr. Bradford that she 
had signed that quit claim deed, did you? 
A. We discussed it the whole time. I mean we 
knew right when we went in, we said, "Okay, we're 
going to develop the property, where's the money going 
to go when they get the money?" And they said, "Well, 
it's only fair half goes to his side and half goes to 
the other." 
Q. My question is when the quit claim deed was 
signed did you tell Mr. Bradford it had been signed? 
A. Not in so many words, no. 
MR. PATTON: Thank you. 
(End of partial transcript) 
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